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Abstract
The British Mandate’s actions of state-building in Palestine were informed by a ZionistWestern modernist envisioned past of Palestine. This state-building ideology was
embedded within much of the bureaucracy of the Mandate’s system and infringed on
numerous Palestinian institutions such as Waqf. Waqf was disenfranchised in particular
through the implementation of urban development programs, like town planning and
archaeological regimes, which sought to support the British-Zionist recasting of
Palestine.
This thesis aims to show how the British’s ideology of Palestine informed the Mandate’s
internal polices and actions which infringed on the rights of waqf. This was done through
two axes of inquiry. The first axis analyses the role of British programs and institutions,
and I take the example of town planning policies as a site for analysis. I demonstrate that
town planning designed by appointed British town planners understood Palestine through
a Zionist-Christian lens. This ideological lens was a presumption of the Mandate powers
that Palestine was by definition the historical site of the Hebrew/Israeli peoples and thus
the proper site of a nation-state building effort for a modern Zionist state. This statebuilding effort was legitimized within the British official mind in Palestine and more
specifically by the Mandate’s Department of Archaeology. The crafting of a historical
claim of a national-mythology through collecting ancient artifacts were used by the
Department of Archaeology to give credence to the political efforts of the British and
Zionist state-building efforts as a means of grounding their modernization mythology of
Palestine ought to be the future home of the Jews. This placed the proper procedure of
nationalization of the modern state on an ancient historical foundation in which saw that
only through the re-injection of that ancient historical foundation a modern state in
Palestine could emerge.
The second axis of inquiry looks at the specific case study of Jerusalem and selects two
episodes of contention. The two episodes show how the state formation process of the
Mandate privileged the Zionist-Christian mythology of Palestine over the Palestinian
political and social experience prior to the Mandate. The first site of contention is where
the Department of Archaeology and the Supreme Muslim Council battled over the
defining of the White Minaret in Ramla Palestine. This case shows the privileging of the
Zionist-Christian envisioning of the built environment over the legal waqf rights of the
Minaret. The second site of contention is situated in the walls of Jerusalem. This site
shows how Town Planning schemes, and the Department of Archaeology worked in
tandem to restore the city as a Jewish site through the removal of Palestinian built
environments on and near the wall. This, again, privileged a Zionist-Christian
understanding of Jerusalem over the lived space of Palestinians within Jerusalem.
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1. Introduction
Historically, Waqf has played a central role in the society and culture of the Middle East
and through the expansion of Islam. The institution can be described as a socio-political and
religious network within the life of the regions which were affected by Islamic jurisprudence and
rule. Over the history of the Middle East, this institution gained further strength as non-Muslim
peoples were using the institution for their churches, synagogues and denominational businesses,
and medical care facilities, among others. This study aims to articulate how this institution
changes under the transition from the Ottoman Empire into the British Mandate Palestine. I
argue that through the presence of the British Mandate system the urban waqf fabric of Palestine
was transformed by new systems of hegemony. This transformation was mediated through
British concepts of Holy Land and their overarching goals for the region leading up to and
through World War I. Particularly for Palestine this was a re-biblicalization of the land in a
duality of promise of the resettlement of Zionist Jews to a “homeland” and a long history (most
of the 1800s) of casting the majority of the Middle East in a “antiquity” manner. This
reconceptualization of geography paired with modes of colonial and British free markets and
state oversight predisposed Britain in the Mandate to use law, through a normative guise, as a
means to recast Palestine into a dreamed vision and away from a lived reality. During the British
Mandate of Palestine, the institution of Waqf was infringed on by colonial urban development
programs based in a Zionist-Western modernist ideology of Palestine.
Modernism within this historical analysis of change in Palestine functions a dualistic
manner. If taking Peter Wanger’s definintion of modernity as, “… the belief in the freedom of
the human being… …and in the human capacity to reason, combined with the intelligibility of
the world, that is, its amenability to human reason… …translates into the principles of individual
9

and collective self-determination and in the expectation of ever-increasing mastery of nature and
ever more reasonable interaction between human beings.”1 This definition being somewhat of a
base line, though modernity is not a concept of single origin or understanding, human capacity to
reason, have self-determinization politically and socially, and master over nature or
industrialization are benchmarks of a modernizing society or state. The scale of this
transformation varies from society to society, but markers of grater centralization, local political
participation in the system, and industrialized education indicate a movement towards a modern
state. The first modernity in the thesis is explored within Chapter 2 as historical and political
context to the Mandate in Palestine under the Ottoman Empire. Modernism within Palestine
under the Ottoman Empire was one of centralization, growing local political participation, and
stronger educational systems for the growing industrial and bureaucratic institutions. These
developments, though, were emerging within the socio-political context of Palestine. There were
auxiliary effects within the modernization efforts of European market expansion, but the whole
share of political and social modernization was progenitive within the Palestinian and Ottoman
society.
The second modernity that is used within the thesis is a patronistic modernity. This
modernity is found within a colonial and European context. Colonial and Imperial powers from
Europe saw their role as the force of modernity within lands they deemed as non-modern, i.e.,
their past and future subjects. Within the specific context of the Mandate system, modernity is
further seen within this frame of functioning. The modernity the British often implored
throughout its domains was one of interjection and supplantation of existing societies and
cultures. This was due to the conceptual basis within their framework of modernity that in order
1

Peter Wagner, Modernity: Understanding the Present, (Polity Press: Cambridge. 2012), pp. 4.
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for modernity to occur it must follow the trajectory of European modernity and thus
Western/European institutions. However, when it came to the contemporary Middle East region
this modernism was couched within a return to ancient foundations. Through re-earthing the
cultures and societies of ancient Babylon and Palestine state build of a modern nation could be
conducted. This modernization was two-fold then, the attempted reviving of an ancient
traditional culture and the direct implementation of European institutions in the region for the
integration in a globalized world and market. Thus, this thesis aims to examine how British
urban development programs, specifically town planning and archaeological regimes, turned
Waqf into a site of political and urban struggle as a bi-product of this overarching
colonial/political scheme. The This chapter focuses on the overall scope of the study, its
historiography, methodology, and the important literature within the field of this study.

1.1

Background on Waqf

Being both a public and private institution, waqf ( ) ََو ْقفhas been a central cornerstone to

the life and society of the Islamic Civilization. In some ways, as Muhammad Zubair Abbasi
argues, waqf is “described as the most important institution, which provided the foundation for
Islamic civilization, as it was interwoven with the entire religious life and the social economy of
Muslims2.” Unlike the landed ecclesial institutions of Europe, waqf has consisted of nearly all
sectors of public life.3 From coffee shops, Mosques, schools, water ways, to railroads; waqf
endowments encompassed both private and public life in the Islamic World.4 Waqf as a key
institution of the Islamic Civilization has roots to nearly the beginning of civilizations. Rather
than being developed out of directly quoted texts of the Qur'an, waqf was developed through the
Muhammad Zubaur Abbasi, ”The Classical Islamic Law of Waqf: A Concise Introduction,” in Arab Law
Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2012), pp. 121 [121-153]
3
Develop this further *breifly*.
4
Id., 121-122
2
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principle of charity found within the Qu’ran.5 From this principle, early jurists (qadi) and
scholars (ummah) developed the system of waqf.
The first three generations of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750 AD) and the Arab Islamic
expansion developed a specialized department (diwan) of the government (central power), which
overlooked the system of waqf.6 However, it was not until around the year 755 AD that waqf was
more formally defined as a part of the jurisprudence system within Islamic governance and
society.7 For this study, there will be a primary focus on the Hanafi application of the law
regarding waqf within the timeframe of the study. From 755 AD on there are some deviations
from the Hanafi madhab or school ( )مذهبlike the Salafi and the Maliki schools, but they play a
minor role as they are not as central to the study nor within the context of the Ottoman Empire.
Furthermore, these schools only have very small differences when it comes to the interpretations
rendering of the law on waqf.
There is a clear structure and legal framework that developed within the Islamic
jurisprudence of establishing waqf. Like other parts of fiqh, waqf delineation within the different
madhabat (pl. of madhab) had only minor differences between them. They all have the same
basic language around the formation of the waqf with only some minimal variations. First, within
the fiqh of waqf, the founder of the waqf needed to convert private property into endowed
property. This conversion is guided by the principle of perpetuity or the “prohibition of tasarruf”
or the exchange of cash for property.8 Once the transformation of private property into endowed
Id., 124, fn. 11: See these verses in the Qu‘ran for where early jurists derived the conceptual understanding of
waqf: Al-An'am 27; 30; Saba: 31; Al-Sdffat: 24. Ifran Ahmed Shaikh, ”The Foundations of Waqf Institutions: A
Historical Perspective,” in Intellectual Discourse, Special Issue (2018), pp. 1216. [1213-1228]
6
Abbasi, 214; and Shaikh, 1216.
7
Shaikh, pp. 1216.
8
The majority of the Hanafi school sees that once a waqf is endowed the former private property is prohibited from
being ”sold, gifted, or inherited”. This stipulation could be worked around if there is clear dilapidation of the waqf
property and cannot be used further. Then it either reverts to the administration qadi (local jurist) or is reverted to
the family of the founder. However, for the most part once the waqf property is ”legalized and set” the property is in
5
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property was enacted, any surplus funds from the now endowed property must be used solely for
charitable purposes (tasaddaqa).9 This action would in most cases remove the endowed property
from the public market. Thus, the waqf deed (waqiffiya) must have these three aspects within the
language of the deed: 1) “the endower states that he endowed”; 2) in sabbala (سبَّلة
َ ) or reserved
for God’s usage; 3) and as previously mentioned, principally created for charity purposes.
Additionally, within the waqqiffiya the stipulations of the waqf are laid out. These stipulations
would indicate which founder’s property (mawquf/mawqufat) would be endowed, the beneficiary
(mawquf ‘alayhi / mustahiqq), what would be the instrument which created the surplus profit
(manfa’a), and who would be the manager of the waqf property. All these, including whatever
else the founder desired to include within their stipulations, make up the legal and religious
formation of waqf.10

1.2

Literature Overview on Waqf Studies

Waqf being studied as an Islamic Institution beyond the Shari’a Courts and Islamic
Scholars started with European Orientalists. In David S. Powers’ article, “Orientalism,
Colonialism, and Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and
India,” he argues that colonial expansion into Algeria and India required the study of waqf for
the purposes land purchase in French Alegria and British India. The study of legal texts was used
de-facto ownership of the beneficiaries. See, M.Z. Abbasi, ”The Classical Law of Waqf: A Concise Introduction,” in
Arab Law Quarterly, Vol. 26. (2012), pp. 126-127. [121-153]
9
Charity is arguably one of the most central and fundamental aspects of Islam. Waqf being a voluntary charitable
function within Islam, it is falls under this impetus of Islamic life and thought. Charity, unlike European charity,
within Islam is both obligation of personal piety within Islam but it also intended to be a socio-economic stabilizer
and is used to protect the well- being of communal well-being in all its forms. For a more in-depth discussion of the
origin and impetus of saddaqa see, Salwa Amirah Awang, Fidizan Muhammad, Joni Tamkin Borhan, Mohammad
Taquiddin Mohamad, ”The Concept of Charity in Islam: An Analysis on the Verses of the Quran and Hadith,” in
Journal of Usuluddin, vol. 45, no. 1 (2017), pp 141-172.
10
Dina Ishak Bakhoum, “The Waqf System: Maintenance, Repair, and Upkeep,” in Held in Trust: Waqf in the
Islamic World, ed. Pascale Ghazaleh. (Cairo: AUC Press, 2011), pp. 180.
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to defunct the type of waqf (in North Africa habs) in which benefited family; or ahli waqf as it is
referred to in Bilad al-Sham.11 In the same vein orientalist production of knowledge on waqf also
happened in regard to Palestine under the Ottomans and the British for the purpose of policy.
The production of this literature was done in both direct and indirect ways.
A key sample of this literature would include R.C. Tute’s Ottoman Land Law (1929) and
his article production in law journals, Fredric Maurice Goadby’s Introduction to the Study of
Law: A Handbook for the Use of Law Students in Egypt and Palestine (1921) and International
and Inter-religious private law in Palestine (1926), Goadby and Moses J. Doukhan’s The Land
Law of Palestine (1935), J. B. Barron Mohammaden Wakfs in Palestine (1922), and Abraham
Grannot’s Land Problems in Palestine (1929) and The Land System in Palestine: History and
Structure (1952). This literature, except for Grannot’s Land System, was produced in the aim of
helping the Mandate system to create policy for land and property. The works that are cited the
most often as primary sources of this period are Tute’s Ottoman Land Laws, and Barrron’s
Mohammaden Wakfs in Palestine.12 Other scholarly work, like that of the law student manual,
were products of the British regime that do not directly focus on waqf but are used when
discussing waqf. These sources highlight certain aspects of the waqf system but from the vantage
11

Powers shows that the application is different in reference to British and French hegemonic policy ends, however
the goal was the same; to exert control over and understanding of waqf in their colonies. David S. Powers,
“Orientalism, Colonialism, and Legal History: The Attack on Muslim Family Endowments in Algeria and India,” in
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Jul. Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 535-571
12
The production of knowledge on Waqf did not end with the British Mandate. The key authors that have produced
key work on waqf after the British Mandate are J.N.D Anderson (1955, 1959), Aharon Layish (1997), U.
Kupferschmidt (1985), Michael Dumper (1983, 1994), Yitzhak Rieter (1991, 1995), Salim Tamari (2017, 2018), and
Munir Fakher Eldin and Salim Tamari (2018). J.N.D Anderson’s work is centered around the legal system of Islam
throughout the early 1900s and how these legal systems changed. Anderson’s most cited text is his Islamic law in
the Modern World in which he details in 1959 the way in which modern Islamic law breaks away from traditional
Islam jurisprudence. This break away from the traditional law framework is generated from the implementation of
modern Western laws within the traditional system. Anderson some claims these laws are the Commercial Code of
1850, the Penal Code of 1858 and so on. Thus, modern Islamic law is not born from a modernization of within but a
modernization from the outside. Or, the modern Islamic law system could not have adapted without the
implementation of Western modernization. See Anderson, J. N. D. Sir and American Council of Learned Societies.
Islamic Law in the Modern World. (New York: New York University Press), 1959, pp 21.
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point of the British within Palestine. They, in some part, help within contextualizing the British’s
motives towards waqf within Palestine, but often are used to essentialize waqf study. Rather than
addressing how waqf function as a living institution, they often just describe the institution and
its holdings (buildings, businesses, charities, etc.).
Scholarly works by Aharon Layish, U. Kumpferschmidt, and Yitzhak Rieter are among
the grouping of essentialized studies within this literature. They give detailed descriptions of
waqf within the British Mandate, as well as the laws and institutions that came into dialogue with
the waqf system. Aharon Layish’s “The Family Waqf and the Sharʿī Law of Succession in
Modern Times” details the presence of the modified endowment called waqf dhuri which gave
legal rights to family members beyond inheritance law. Layish indicates this modification breaks
convention within Islamic law and thus was deemed illegal within Sharia, yet the presence of the
modification within Palestine was high.13 Nada Moumtaz following this pattern has argued that
waqf through the invention of waqf dhuri was intuitive to the updating legal frames, and
religious sentiments within the French Mandate.14 Beshara Dounami has shown within Greater
Syria (1800-1880), specifically Tripoli and Nablus, that this type of waqf played a central role
within these cities and especially within female spaces.15
The other two essentialist works of Islam within Mandated Palestine are Yitzhak Reiter’s
book Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem Under the British Mandate and Uri Kumperschimdt’s
The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British mandate for Palestine. Reiter’s work
details thoroughly the landscape of Islamic waqf within Jerusalem (1914-1918), yet its
Layish, Aharon. 1997. "The Family Waqf and the Sharʿī Law of Succession in Modern Times." in Islamic Law
and Society 4 (3): 352-388
14
Moumtaz, Nada. ""is the Family Waqf a Religious Institution?" Charity, Religion, and Economy in French
Mandate Lebanon." Islamic Law and Society 25, no. 1-2 (2018): 37-77.
15
Beshara Dounami,"Endowing Family: Waqf, Property Devolution, and Gender in Greater Syria, 1800 to 1860."
Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, no. 1 (1998): 3-41
13
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essentialist character comes out through his description of the institution within Jerusalem and
not the way in which it functioned within the transforming city. When discussing waqf, Reiter
never explores any cases or colonial history that could indicate why the waqf system changes
during this period. However, his work is often cited as an/the authoritative study on the subject.16
Similarly, Uri Kupferschimdt’s work on the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) is additionally
often cited as the authoritative historical study of the SMC. The SMC within the British Mandate
was the religious-political organization that oversaw religious matters of Palestine, particularly
the waqf system. An important claim within his work, is that the British authorities were ‘naïve’
in their creation of the SMC as an act of appeasement within Palestine; and thus, unwilling
giving them political power.17 Nicholas E. Roberts’ counter argument within his work: ‘Islam
Under the Palestinian Mandate’, provides a more nuanced perspective of the SMC within a
colonial system. Roberts’ argument is that the SMC was created as a means to control the
Islamic population within Palestine.18 This control was not generated from naivety, but from
colonial experience with Islam and Muslim subjects, particularly Cyprus, India, Bosnia, and
Herzegovina.
Timar Kuran’s work also represents a contemporary orientalist view on waqf. Kuran has
recently argued that the reason why the contemporary Middle East is authoritarian lays
principally within Ottoman economic and jurisprudential legacies, the millet system, and
principally waqf. In his work, “Legal Roots of Authoritarian Rule in the Middle East: Civic
Legacies of the Islamic Waqf,” Kuran argues that since beneficiaries of awqaf had no say in the
Salim Tamari in 2018 still cites it as such in. “Waqf Endowments in the Old City of Jerusalem: Changing Status
and Archival Sources.” In Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840-1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City, edited
by Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire, 1:490–509. Brill, 2018.
17
Nicholas E. Roberts, Islam under the Palestine Mandate Colonialism and the Supreme Muslim Council
, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), pp. 7.
18
Ibid.
16
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selection of the officers of the awqaf, this created a week civil society and therefore a habit of
submitting to an authoritarian rule.19 In Kuran’s book The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law
Held Back the Middle East, he additionally argues that Islamic law, with special attention to
waqf, has historically been unable to provide the conditions of building strong civil societies and
private capital development and states this is as a key understanding of the “backwardness” of
the Middle East20. For Kuran it was not colonialism or other external influences, but rather the
ideological failing of the region itself. Thus, like many of the Western academics and the
politicians of the turn of the 20th century, Kuran argues that failure is derived from civilization’s
ethos, and The Ottoman Empire, and subsequently the Modern Middle East, because the
Ottomans did not develop a Western democratic/capitalist state structure. Timur Kuran’s
ideological positioning shows orientalism still exists but moreover serves as a contemporary
example of the colonialist minds of the British Mandate in Palestine. For the Mandate officials,
the political stagnancy of Bilad Ash-Sham was the lack of modernity not democracy.
On the other hand, Michael Dumper, Salim Tamari, and Munir Fakher Eldin’s work
represents what Nicholas Roberts and Laura Roberts calls for the movement towards a modern
history of Palestine that is sui generis.21 This historiographical framework seeks to show that
Palestinian had a starting point before the advent of the British Mandate or with the formation of
the State of Israel. In fact, Palestine, and in particular waqf, was in the process of change long
before the British’s control. The development of a modern Palestine does not begin with the
Mandate, but has precedent in the Late Ottoman fabric. This does not disregard the emergence of
19

Kuran, Timur. "Legal Roots of Authoritarian Rule in the Middle East: Civic Legacies of the Islamic Waqf." In
The American Journal of Comparative Law 64, no. 2 (2016): 419-454.
20
Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2011).
21
Nicholas E. Roberts, Islam under the Palestine Mandate Colonialism and the Supreme Muslim Council, pp. 8.
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the conflict between the Zionist setters and the local Palestinians, but moves the historiographical
center away from nationalist struggles to one of multilayered causal changes. Michael Dumper’s
Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State is an early attempt of
contextualizing waqf within this framework. His work details waqf throughout the Mandate and
in the State of Israel. Within his first chapter, he attempts to give more nuance than his teacher
Yitzhak Rieter on the state of waqf within the British Mandate, yet his periodization lends his
historiography towards older frameworks. However, his main thrust shows a continuity between
Ottoman precedence in conflict with the advent of the British in Palestine.22
Similarly, Salim Tamari’s The Great War and the Remaking of Palestine is one of these
first historical works that attempts to bridge the Ottoman Past to the contemporary British
Mandate moment. His historical study sheds light on how Palestine was changing before the
British Mandate and how this change was transforming the landscape of the local population
before and during the war. For instance, Tamari shows how Adele Aszar (a Rumi Orthodox
Educator) was able to use Church waqf to educate women and help them find employment
within a modernizing society. He thus demonstrates how waqf played a more unified and
transformative societal role within Palestinian society and was not merely an Islamic
institution.23 In addition, Munir Eldin and Salim Tamari’s 2018 study on waqf in “the Old City”
of Jerusalem gives a more nuanced picture of the life of within the city. The major breakthrough
of this is how varied the waqf system was within Jerusalem being an institution that was used by
both Muslims and Christians alike.24
22
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This brief literature overview illustrates a research gap in historical research that looks at
the institution of waqf during this period of societal and political change.

1.3

Geography and Periodization of the Study

For this historical narrative the space and the periodization of the study is defined as
such: rather than referring the physical space in my narrative as ‘The Middle East’, I will use the
terms Bilad al-Sham or Palestine where the most applicable. In reference to British
understanding of the region, the usage of the term Middle East will be used. However, the
reference to “The Middle East” will not be used when referring to my study proper. This is due
to “The Middle East” often having many definitions and that geography is constructed in terms
of realpolitik as well. In particular, the political boundaries of the region were changing
throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Similarly, when referencing “Ottoman”, the definition is a delineation of stateadministrative and not as a monolithic term to define Palestine or the whole of Bilad Al-Sham.
By defining this region as Ottoman “pure”, it insinuates that the region is Ottoman “stagnant”
rather than Ottoman “dynamic”.25 Through the nineteenth century, cities and regions were
‘thinking for themselves’, in the sense that regionally and geographically identities of local polity
were being formed.
The periodization of the study will primarily focus on years 1918-1929 of the British
Military control and the Mandate in Palestine. The main thrust of the study will focus on the
latter part of the British control, as this is where most of pertinent state-building actions are
25

Two authors that have recently informed this thinking are Cem Emrence and Jacob Noris. They both argue that
the land in which Ottoman controlled were transforming both in political space and geography organization
throughout the 1800s.
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found. However, the period leading up to the Mandate is paid attention to in Chapter two as this
gives context to Palestine prior to the Mandate. This period is important in two ways. The first is
that during this period new transformations within the Ottoman Empire emerged, and second,
Ottoman Law continued to be used as “normative law” by British Mandate officials, and
therefore is key in the discussion of the legal and state system that the British placed on
Palestine.26

26
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1.4

Historiography and Methodology

This thesis aims to join in the effort of non-Orientalist understandings of the history of
Bilad al-Sham and Palestine. One of the main objectives of this thesis is to show how the waqf
system transformed socially and politically within the transition to the hegemonic power of the
British Mandate. This thesis attempts to show how this transformation affected aspects of waqf,
in addition to what this effect on the institution tells us about the changing region in the early
1900s. The implemented historiography of this thesis is referred to as structural-contextualism.
Structural-contextualism is the way in which an institution can be understood to act
within history not as an artifact but as a participator. The function of participation here is in the
result of how people used waqf when new contexts arise or how when new political/cultural
frameworks change the way in which waqf can participate within the new system’s end goals.27
It allows for a more in-depth and granular understanding of how institutions change over time.
Rather than analyzing the object or person itself/themselves, the structure and context “around,
in, and by” the institution studied is applied to the action of the person or object within the
historical fabric and matrix.28 This framework of institutional historiography is akin Charles
Tilly’s understanding of change within the urban sector and migration. He states:
“Intergroup conflicts over jobs, land, or political power create new social
actors: active social classes, occupational guilds, political communities, ethnic
27

This is a comparable method to that of Anthony Giddens in what he calls structuration. His structuration is
connected to the discipline of Urban History and that “historical formation of situations [are] delimited by time and
space whose enduring social arrangements people take for granted and allow to shape their actions.” Or, how the
historical moment that people participate in are affected by the special and temporal structures they exist in. Charles
Tilly, “What Good is Urban History?” in Journal or Urban History, Vol. 22 (1996), pp. 710. (702-719).
28
A good example of this would be the structural-contextual change of most American houses in the 1950-60s. Due
to the influx of money in the post-WWII America and the invention of Air Conditioning housing in the US changed
from having a front porch for sitting and chatting with neighbors to having a secluded area behind the house for
individual privacy.
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groups, parties, and so on. The presence of those organized actors then alters
the character and outcome of conflict... In all these processes, time and place
matter fundamentally; when and where they occur affects how they occur.”29
Charles Tilly’s discussion on how migration movements create urban policies is in theory
paralleled to that of the British and Ottoman policies in Palestine. It is not merely just policies
that directly affect the waqf institution but also how those policies that affect waqf indirectly.
Conditional pressures in space and time affect institutions, people groups, and the whole system;
especially if the political or social structure is defining that geographical space in radically new
ways.
Structure is being defined within this historiography as the inter-relation between
peoples, institutions and power. Like that of post-structuralism, structure does not appeal to
singular or linear developmentalism or historical determinism. Structure is both the framework
of power within institutions and the political organization, and the matrix of change through new
implementations of state/colonial policy on society and institutions, whether it be local, Ottoman,
or British. ￼ Structure is the institutions, the social and political stratosphere, religion, grounded
frameworks around gender, class, and others, and the change to those parts of structure form
within and from without. One way to understand how waqf changes over time and space then is
to look at the conditional changes in other parts of the structure it functions within. Here, poststructural critique is helpful, as the structural effects of Ottoman power and policy had different
effects on separate regions like that of Bilad al-Sham. Change and development within a
sociopolitical system is not uniform, especially within its institutions and regions. An example of
Tilley further conditions this in the understanding of, “Those choices themselves {migration affecting urban
policies like labour and housing] follow historicist logic, depending heavily on what has happened previously in
particular times and polices.” Ibid, 711,712, and 714.
29
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a change in institutions having multi-variable changes is through the advent of trains and the
telegraph. Benjamin Sidney and Michael Schwantes have shown through the implementation of
new technology within the institutions of transportation, commerce and communication the US
legal system, societal framework, and so on was drastically changed. Thus, it is not a spirit in the
Hegelian understanding that molds state and society, but the multilayered affects from changes to
institutions and the developments by the system of the “state-society” relation. 30 Waqf then
within this purview structure is seen not as static but responsive to the changes around it and the
changes that happen to it.
Context within the historiographical framework is defined as the variables of events.
Structural changes are the modifications to the machinery of the system whereas the context is
the meaning in which that machinery is formed. Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock define
context as texts in “context”.31 The meaning of context within their understanding of text, time
and space is helpful when attempting to understand historical texts via its time and space.
However, context within the historiography is the analysis of change of hegemony through
multiple applied variables like cultural assumptions, religious and political adherences, and
Imperial goals. Within the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the British Palestinian
Mandate, legal texts, culture, and so on were not viewed by the British ex nihilo but through their
political and cultural institutions, and the aims in which British desired for Palestine. As an
example, the application of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code in Palestine was used to build a Zionist
state through that legal framework. Thus, contextual fabric within this study thus means the
30
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events and changes that happen at the state and local level that have direct or indirect effects on a
particular part of society, culture, religion, etc. through an external lens of meaning. What a
power believes to be true within their ideology places function on how they use law and policies.
The application of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code was conditioned by the British Mandate’s
commitment to the Zionist colonial project through participating in that state-building effort.
Context here then is not defined within the ontological function of understanding texts but within
the teleological function of the purpose of ends. This kind of context allows for the analysis of
how the institution of waqf changes over time via new modes of meaning being placed on the
machinery of the system.

1.4.1. Methodology
The methodology of this study is grounded in the historiography laid out in this chapter,
and through the transitions in hegemony between the Ottoman and British Imperial systems
within Palestine. This methodology is primarily narrative and qualitative in nature. Chapters Two
and Three are more narrative driven as they focus more on the emergent secondary academic
works on Palestine, the British Empire and the Ottoman Empire. However, this narrative offers
an understanding of the Ottoman and British Empire within Bilad Ash-Sham as parallel agents
and how their agencies effected their view or action within the region. Chapters Four and Five
are where qualitative methods are employed through the use of primary sources. These sources
are British and Arab data, and are used in connection with secondary sources to show how
British policies affected waqf within Palestine. These primary resources are documents retrieved
from the Official Gazette of the Government of Palestine, the British Mandate Department of
Antiquities, and Department of Health, and others have been supplemented form the Palestinian
Online Museum Archive. The integration of primary and secondary sources function as a means
24

of understanding how waqf was molded by the transition from the Ottoman rule to the British
rule.
The limitations of this study are, even though receiving a research grant from The
American University of Cairo, I was not able to study archival materials in person. The original
plan was to travel to the United Kingdom, but Covid 19 travel restrictions inhibited these plans.
Due to lack of travel, I was not able to access these primary resources widely, and more
specifically, I could not access Arabic sources that would have given this study fuller nuance.
Unfortunately, many Palestinian archives are not digitized, while Open Jerusalem and British
National archives were “only in person” documents and travel to them was required. Similarly,
two important archives that will be important for future research are Jerusalem municipal archive
and the archives of the Supreme Muslim Council. However, I was able to find primary sources
from the Israeli State Archives online platform and other online archives that provided the data
for the outcomes of this study.

1.5

Research Contribution

This thesis contributes to the study of waqf, Palestine, and the British Mandate in two ways.
This research first contributes to the literature on Waqf in Palestine by highlighting the
connection of how waqf was a living institution that was infringed on by the state-building
regimes within Palestine. The second contribution lies in the analytical usage of Department of
Archaeological (DOA) documents under the British Mandate and collating them with secondary
sources. These primary sources and their dialogue with other regimes, like that of the Town
Planning Commission have not been fully explored during this period. The DOA documents are
often comprehensive in that they offer multiple voices within them. Within this study, the
25

documents had Zionist, British and Palestinian voices in collection. These voices give a fuller
picture to the effects that the archaeological regimes had within Palestine. Additionally, these
sources and their analysis illustrates how these auxiliary departments implemented a ZionistChristianized view of Palestine into a hegemonic system destabilizing local institutions. This is
politically important on two fronts. The first front is that through the implementation of a
national-mythology within the mechanisms of the Mandate system and state building efforts. The
creation a modern state in Palestine and “securing of the future home of the Jews” in the Balfour
Declaration (1917) was supported by both a modernist and eugenic-religious mythology of
Palestine within history. A modern state would emerge, as it were, through the reintroduction of
a “native” population to Palestine supported by an ideological production of historical artifacts
for the proof of that national-myth. This under discussed framework within the mechanism of the
Mandate contributes to understanding how Palestine changes politically under the Mandate.
These two contributions aide in the discussion of agency on the part of the British Mandate
and how they were participators of overturning Palestinian society for the benefit of the Zionist
movement. Thus, this thesis contributes to the research on Waqf Studies by illustrating how the
institution went beyond religious charitable properties and plays a role alongside national
struggle. In particular, this study shows how this role helped activate Palestinians in a political
struggle against the British and settler colonialism.

1.6

Thesis Outline

In order to show this transforming relationship between waqf and hegemony this study is broken
down into five chapters. Chapter 2 functions as the backdrop of Palestine leading up to the
Mandate. The chapter details how the Palestinian political economy was developing under the
late Ottoman rule. This developing political economy saw a greater localization of political
26

power as a result of the Ottoman modernization efforts. Part of the localization of political life in
Palestine saw that institutions ought to be localized as well. One of these institutions was waqf.
Chapter 3 details the development of an ideological position towards Palestine that was ZionistChristian and modernist. This ideology was found within the ‘official mind’ of the Imperial
officers and goals. Within this ‘official mind’ Palestine was seen as the past and future home of
Zionist Jews. This chapter gives further context to how the British enacted certain policies and
regimes within Palestine to promote this goal and state-building. Chapter 4 deals with two
characters, the Supreme Muslim Council and the Biologist-Town Planner Patrick Geddes. This
chapter takes macro-geopolitical movements and intellectual history and grounds them into how
the “urban” was being defined and sustained at the local level. Chapter 5 details how the
commitment to the Zionist movement and state-build goals were supported by the Mandate’s
Town Planning Commission and the Department of Archaeology. The chapter shows through
two case studies, “The Tower of Ramla” and Jerusalem, how these departments and the town
planning and archaeological regimes supported the state-building and infringed on the rights of
waqf in the process. This shows that the Mandate power needed to control the physical space and
to create a narrative of that space for the benefit of recasting that space into a Zionist meaning.
Chapter 6 concludes this study by synthesizing the role of waqf under the Mandate through a
reflection on the workings of power and control within urban landscape under the British in
Palestine.

27

2. Transformation in Palestinian Political Economy 1900-1919
3.1 Introduction
At the turn of the 19th century Palestine was, like much the rest of the world, shifting
drastically within its social and political zeitgeist. This chapter functions as the historical context
of Palestinian political economy transformations leading up to the Mandate. The chapter will be
broken up into two sections in order to show the changing political economy within Palestine
from the 1880s through the 1910s. The first section deals with a brief and general description of
the changes within the political economy within the Ottoman Empire. The second section details
how Palestinian institutions were reacting to structural changes that occurred within that sociopolitical context. The second section is divided further into three sections. The first section
details the Palestinian education and how this supports modernization efforts within Palestine.
The second section shows how local government administration was changing due to a growing
civil-society. Finally, in the third section waqf is discussed within these developments as the
institution was viewed within the development of the political economy of Palestine. The
discussion of the political economy of Palestine leading up to the Mandate era is important as the
Mandate defuncted this political economy and serves as a contrast to the political economy
implemented by the Mandate officials.

3.2 The Changing Political Economy of Ottoman Palestine
Historians within the late 1800s and throughout the 1900s have often defined the later part
of the Ottoman Empire as ‘in decline’. This fatalistic historiography is one that has Orientalized
the later part of the Ottoman Imperial history as non-inventive, and non-developing.32 The
32
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Ottoman Empire throughout the 1800s saw the rapid growth of a new bureaucracy. This new
bureaucracy was supported by the growing Ottoman Military, changes within the Ottoman
education systems, and new infrastructure projects namely transportation. Through the
modernization efforts, the relationship of ‘subject to empire’ changed as new ways of upward
movement within the political hierarchy changed through the very same modernization efforts.
Amit Bein has shown that the change of education particularly in the Hamaidian period (18761909) was the “implementation of a systemic program of education with a view to molding the
population into disciplined citizens.”33 These ‘disciplined citizens’ would then in turn become
employed within the new bureaucracy closing the loop. Michael Provence has also shown that
the interconnection of military, education, and modernization also helped to produce this
bureaucracy.34 Education within the Ottoman Military was supported by conscription and being
subsidized by the Ottoman government. Even though civil and Qur’anic schools were prominent
within late Ottoman society military schools were free. This allowed for more people within the
Ottoman Empire to become educated and in turn supported the Ottoman modernization efforts
on the whole.35
This dual process of education and modernization within the emergence of the growing
Ottoman bureaucracy changed the political economy throughout the Empire. Through the 1800s
civil servants saw a strong increase in numbers. There were 2,000 scribal servants in 1770, and
therefore, the modernization that took place in Ottoman lands will have different trajectories than that of Europe.
Even though there may be some overlap. For a brief introduction of Neo-Ottomanism see ”Introduction” in M.
Hakan Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of Neo-Ottomanism, (Oxford University Press, London: 2020),
pp. 1-17.
33
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34
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Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 15, 16, and 19.
35
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the bureaucratic service grew to between 35,000-70,000 persons by the Young Turk regime.36
The bureaucratic personnel served in positions of, “the ministers of finance, charitable
foundations (evkaf), education, trade and agriculture, customs, and land registry.”37 The
development of this bureaucracy was also supported by the development of new technologies
and practices within the Ottoman Empire. Railroads, telegraphs, newspapers, the economy, and
public spaces where all parts of the new Ottoman infrastructure developed from the new
bureaucracy and education. Railroads during this time period were some of the most sought after
in terms of development in Ottoman lands.38 The ease of access to resources throughout the
Ottoman lands and access to their subjects grew.39 The Porte could move resources and capital
with more ease for internal and external trade and throughout the later 1800s into the 1910s show
a positive growth of development.40 The Ottoman Empire brought the governed peripherals
closer to the center due to railroads provide easier access to them creating new commercialized
regions, but also formed new relationships to the Ottoman central bureaucracy.41
This development helped undergird much of the other policies that the Ottoman Empire
was enacting and allowed for capital expansion at the Imperial level, but also at the regional
36
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level.42 Cities during the latter half of the 1800s until the fall of the Empire in 1918 were
growing at an exceptional rate. This is partly due to rural migration to the cities, international
trade and investment,43 but in part it was due to the Ottoman investment of railroads, education
and capital throughout its domain.44 Bernard Hourcade has shown the considerable growth of
Ottoman cities during the late Ottoman period. For instance, Damascus in 1800 had an estimated
population size of 90,000 in 1800 and by 1930, the population grew to 216,000 or a 240%
growth rate. In 1800, the population of Beirut was 6,000, and by 1930 it reached 150,000 people.
The rate of growth was immense between 1850 and 1900 with a 300 % increase in its
population45. In the general growth of Ottoman lands the Fertile Crescent (Syria, Palestine, Iraq,
Jordan) was the fastest growing region by 1950 with an annual growth of 4.9 % which was
steady increasing from 1850. The sector with the greatest growth was urban.46 The next part
details how these changes applied within Palestine during this period.
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3.3 Transitional Palestine: From the 1880s to the Eve of World War I
Ottoman modernization and the growing of the bureaucracy was dispersed throughout all
of the Ottoman lands. These developments helped to produce change within Palestine. One of
these changes was the urban fabric and how cities fit within the late Ottoman political economy.
Cities were greatly expanding as more modes of capital were being gained by the Ottoman
realm.47 Cities were also growing closer in relationship with their rural counterparts. Throughout
the 19th century cities and rural centers were growing interdependent for the supply of capital and
for commodities to be sold locally and externally. This growing interdependence can be seen in
the interconnectedness of the supply-chain of commodities and the control cities and rural areas
had over the exchange of commodities. The growing relationship of cities and rural sectors to
the Ottoman government (centralization) and the penetration of European presence held great
influence on this development.48
Cem Emerence from an Imperial geographical historiography has shown through looking
at the Late Ottoman period not through a monolithic geography. Instead, the approach adopts a
trichotomic geography of Coast, Interior, and Frontier, which showed that Arab lands under the
control of the Ottomans developed drastically throughout the 19th century. Emerence shows that
Palestine contained all three of the trichotomy. For instance, Haifa was a city that developed
rather late within the Ottoman Imperial and Palestinian history. Being a seaport, or Coast, Haifa
became a central port for grain export and immigration. The growth of the city allowed for
Bernard Hourcade, “The Demographic of Cities and the Expansion of Urban Space,” in Ed. Peter Sluglett, The
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societal and economic movement and allowed for greater capital acclamation in other
geographical parts of the Palestinian region. The economic boom of the Coastal region allowed
for new merchants and capital owners to reinvest into the Interior regions.49
The Ottoman Empire saw Haifa as an important port city but also the British saw the city
as a strategic port for their investments in the later part of the 19th century. By 1905, about
328,128 tons of British imports were coming into the Haifa port.50 In competition, Jaffa was
another port city that saw rapid expansion towards the end of the 19th century. Much like Haifa,
the Ottoman state, local merchants and entrepreneurs, and European investors saw Jaffa as
another port-city of importance. In 1892, a railway was commemorated connecting Jerusalem to
Jaffa. The construction of the railroad was financed by international investors, supported by
Sultan Abdulhamid II and was couched within modernist language.51 Further elucidating
European economic expansion into Palestine, the investment into Jaffa indicates a more complex
history of Palestine at the turn of the 19th century. However, the coast was becoming more
accessible to the center, and this was an important shift in the regional socio-political
organization of Palestine. It can be argued these localized developments localization was in part
precursors to Arab nationalism Palestine.52
Jerusalem as a part of the interior of Palestine played a greater role within the regional
politics of the region throughout the latter half of the 1800s. Jerusalem was detached from the
larger vilayet of Damascus in 1872 as an independent district with an Ottoman governor. The
reorganization placed Jaffa, Gaza, Ramalah, Beer Sheba and Nazareth under the jurisdiction of
49
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Jerusalem.53 This development in the local politics of the Ottoman Empire was seen by the
Zionist Jews living in the region as a movement forward in the hopes of re-establishing the
Jewish home. For the Arab population this was a continued extension of Ottoman centralization,
but also greater political localization indicating a contradiction in perception of on the ground
transformations between each group. Greater Arab political participation would become more
prominent under the Young Turk government in the form of municipal and the reinstated
parliamentary elections. In particular, petitioning had been one of the main avenues of political
participation of Arabs in the Ottoman Empire.
For instance, from 1876 to 1914, petitions were taken to Istanbul regarding the nature of
Jerusalem. Officials and notables from Jerusalem, Nablus, and Jaffa sought to elevate Jerusalem
from a mustarriflik to a vilayet. Petitioning was an important political tool for Ottoman subjects
and when the Young Turk system was implemented in 1908, petitioning became the mainstay of
local politics for the acquisition of new legal rights and the opening of a new civitas. Petitions
also allowed voices from the periphery to be active within Imperial politics as well. For example,
Bedouins within Palestine were able to voice their concerns within this institution.54 This
political institution was strong as Palestinians used petitioning under the British, but the
legitimacy of them were greatly diminished when it came to rights in opposition to the Mandate
powers. An example of this is a petition in protest of the appointment of Herbert Samuel as The
High Commissioner in June of 1920. A group of prominent Jerusalem urbanites through the pen
of Aref al-Aref stated:
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“The secret appointment of Herbert Samuel, the Zionist, to the position of
The High Commissioner is a bad influence on the souls of the Arab Nation … …
We promise that this is the first step for the goals of the Zionist. We consider it
proof and the clear implementation of the unjust decisions in the plans drawn up
by the San Remo Conference.” 55

Within the Young Turk context, Louis A. Fishman, shows that Jews and Arabs within
Palestine after the reinstatement of the Ottoman Parliament in 1908 vied for political prominence
within the Ottoman system. He argues that nationalism or concepts of an Arab nation-state
within the region of Palestine did not emerge until after WWI and during the British Mandate.
This does not mean that a certain unified form of political identities was not emerging in
Palestine, but it argues that within the closing years of the Ottoman Empire the population of
Palestine saw themselves within a dual framework of Palestinian-Ottoman. This emerging
identity did prime Arab nationalism for a desire for the creation of a nation-state, but those who
had access to the Ottoman bureaucracy and state did not see Palestine as a separate part of the
Empire.56
The later part of the Ottoman Empire within the context of Palestine a sense of republican
(representative) politics was being implement of within the Empire. Even though local politics in
Palestine was still centered around notables, the political and social transformations created new
channels of political activity. Local politics were becoming center-state politics rather than the
traditional subject-ruler. The new local identity, coupled with political changes in the Ottoman
system helped to create a Palestinian civitas that was growing both more centralized but also
55
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more localized.57 Beyond pure politics or the growth of cities Palestine was coupled with the
changing of education, administration, and thus changes within the social milieu.
Through looking at the institutions of educational and municipal development, and the
responses by the waqf system within Palestine leading up to the Mandate period a certain
manifestation of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the ‘organic intellectual’ comes into play.
Society is partly constituted by what he calls the ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ intellectual. The
‘traditional’ intellectual is supported by institutions, groups, classes that undergird the
historically legitimized hegemonic power and the ‘organic’ intellectual which is manifested
through the working class and are generally subjects to hegemonic power. This forms a
dichotomy of power and a dialectic transition of the overturning of intellectuals. Simply put, the
‘traditional’ intellectual is the machine that develops the ‘organic’ intellectual through a variety
of means. Within Palestine, this development of the ‘organic’ is part-and-parcel with new
emerging manners of state-society relationships. What this analysis argues for is that with the
production of the ‘organic’ intellectual, societal changes occur.58 Through changes in education
and the development of the municipalities, and the burgeoning print culture, and growing
integration of Palestine into the global world through markets, immigration among others; helped
to generate a wider and more complex civil society within Palestine leading up to Word War II.
Although much of this development will be reversed or stalled, however, as Palestinian society
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modified, institutions in Palestine modified along with it. The following sections will look at
education, the growing bureaucratic representative Palestinian administration, and waqf within
last years of the Ottoman Palestine (1880-1918) and, show how this transformation was taking
place.

3.3.1 Education
Education lay at the heart of the Ottoman modernist policies, and by the start of WWI,
the district of Jerusalem was a vastly educated district. In 1869, the Ottoman government issued
the Regulation on Public Education which was the blueprint of Ottoman Imperial education
policies being implemented over time. Alongside the implementation of Ottoman Imperial
education, Western missionary schools were gaining prominence within the region. In 1888 the
local population was prohibited from sending their children to missionary schools as a
preventative measure in Jerusalem. In the following year a secondary school was built on
donated Greek Orthodox waqf land. Primary Ottoman and Palestinian education in the Jerusalem
jurisdiction were one of the best within all of the Empire, even though Western missionary
schools were gaining strength. This competition of foreign schools with local schools alongside
the modernization of the Ottoman Empire helped to produce a desire for more modern schools
across the Palestinian society. In 1885, the government appointed 158 teachers, and by 1901,
there were 242 state appointed teachers in Palestine. In order to keep this steady flow of
educators a teacher’s college was opened in Jerusalem in 1905.59
The development of education in Palestine brought, for some not all, a newfound
leverage of mobility within the social world of the Palestine and Ottoman Empire. Through
looking at the lives of prominent Ottoman Arabs access to a varied education led to potential
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new politicians to this mobility. Yusif al-Hakim (b. 1879) was educated through the Ottoman
public school system and was able to climb the political and bureaucratic ladder. In 1913 he
served as both the head of the “Turkish Bureau” in Mount Lebanon, and “the deputy to the
Armenian Ottoman governor Ohanis Pasha Qumnian.”60
Al-Hakim was not the only Palestinian that was rising ranks. Another one of these figures
was ‘Umar al-Salih al-Barghuthi (1894-1865). Coming from the rural gentry, al-Barghuthi
received traditional Islamic schooling in the kuttab madresse, where he was instructed in
reading, writing, arithmetic, theology (tawhid), ’ibadat, calligraphy, geography, and history.
Geography, and history within his schooling were modernized indicating the Ottoman
educational reforms were reaching traditional primary schools. In 1903 he attended the Jewish
Alliance Institute, in order to evade proselytization, though in 1905 he studied at the francophone
Freses des Ecoles Chretiennes missionary school in Beirut. He eventually ended his educational
career at the Imperial University in Beirut. Beirut was the atmosphere where he was immersed
fully in the emerging Muslim modernist mode and reflected on this in his memoir. The Imperial
University imbued an Islamic education within a modernist military frame, but also experienced
a modernist-cosmopolitan city life that he did not experience in Jerusalem. Al-Barghuthi was
intending to continue in the service of the empire even though an injury left him unable to
continue.61
Education within the Late Ottoman and Mandate periods was not only a male venture.
Generating from the bureaucratic middle- and upper-class, women’s benevolence through the
institution of waqf women and under educated people were being educated. Salim Tamari’s
study on Adele Shamat Azar (1886-1968), a Rumi Orthodox women activist and educator,
60
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indicates a movement of women using the Rumi Orthodox waqf system in order to endow
property for the purpose of providing young women and impoverished youth education. She was
effective in providing modern education to women and through this was able to place women in
bureaucratic employment. From her notebook between the years 1911-1948 she stated about her
education efforts:
“I spent extensive efforts in convincing [those families] that there is no shame in
their women seeking gainful employment, as we can witness by them in the
neighboring countries of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. Eventually I was able to
secure employment for these graduates in the departments of Postal Services,
telephone exchanges, and in government civil service. I was able also to find work
in commercial establishments and in hospitals as nurses. For this work I became
known as the Boss, al-Za’eema.”62

Tamari’s study is important for three reasons. The first it shows that women were entering civil
life more frequently. The second was that the growing bureaucratic system was regional wide.
The third is that the confluence of bureaucratic women and modernist goals were developing
within and through the waqf system.63 This shows as a microcosm the way in which Palestinian
society was developing towards a more modernized society leading up to the Mandate system.

3.3.2 Administration
When describing the Late Ottoman State, orientalists usually have framed Ottoman Rule
as hegemonic and in downturn as the “sick man of Europe”. They have claimed that it was this
top down which led to a lack of modernization and economic development. However, as an
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indicator of the opposite the political population in the last fifty years of the Empire grew
exponentially. Within Palestine this was evident by both municipality and parliamentary
elections. These civil-society developments allowed for Palestinians to voice the desired political
changes they wish to see within the Ottoman Empire and locally within Palestine. Politicians
within Palestine were advocating for localizations of taxes, institutions like the waqf system, and
ways in which the Ottoman Empire could stave off Zionist migration. The political participation
at both the local and Imperial level in contrast to the Mandate system in 1921 shows a clear
disjunction of political development within each control. This section details some of the ways
that Palestinians were gaining more political representation within the Late Ottoman Imperial
state system.
In 1867, the Municipalities Law was promulgated throughout the Empire. This law
required heads of the local councils (at the town and city level) to be elected by the local
population. The mayor, however, was chosen by the governor. Eligible voters were males over
the age of 25, landowners who had “an annual property tax of at least 50 qurush, and [another]
property tax of at least 100 qurush.”64 The possible elected officials were chosen from the same
grouping of landowners to run for office.65 Elections were held in four-year spans at a double
rate. This means that half of the elected officials would serve the first two-year session, and the
second half would serve the remainder of the four years.66 This process was a mainstay within
Mahmoud Yazbak, ”Elections in Late Ottoman Palestine: Early Exercises in Political Representation,” in Ed.
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Palestinian politics until the Mandate era. Under the Mandate, however, from 1919 till 1931
there was only one election in the municipalities. Officials within the municipalities were not
elected but appointed in the majority of the first ten years of the Mandate.67
Parliamentary elections were an important part of the Ottoman political system. The
Ottoman Parliament was founded in 1876 but in 1878 it was disbanded by Sultan Abdulhamid II
(1876-1908). It was not until in the second constitutional period under the Young Turk regime
(1908-1918) that the Parliament was reinstated. Within this period Parliament and Parliamentary
elections became fixed within the operations of the Ottoman civil-state system. Parliamentary
elections were held in 1908, 1912, 1914, and 1919. Voting rights for Parliamentary seats were
similar to the municipality elections. Landowning men of 25 and older were allowed to vote and
run for office. In 1912, the Nablus district had 21,372 eligible voters. 32 percent of the urban
dwellers and 38 percent of the rural persons in the Nablus district voted for 33 seats in
Parliament.68 Parliamentary politics played a central role in the local politics of Palestine as well.
In 1911, a group of archaeologists from the Palestinian Exploration Fund69 decided to conduct a
dig in the Al-Buraq wall on Haram al-Sharif in order to find ancient Hebrew relics. The Muslim
population of Jerusalem protested this event after returning from the Nabi Musa pilgrimage.70
During and after an Ottoman state investigation, there were two parliamentary debates on the
incident showing a growing distrust of the British in general, but also a continuance of greater
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Zionist penetration.71 In 1914, the future Mufti of Jerusalem, Said al-Husayni was reelected to
Parliament and submitted a report to parliament laying out the problems of Jewish immigration,
Palestinian emigration, and the local frustrations with the central government.72
In connection with education and the new administration, there are two interesting
insights. First, economic mobility was more possible within this later period. Even though
eligible voters were only men of 25 years old and had to be landowners, new elites were
emerging indicating this mobility. Through the combination of new forms of capital, families of
non-notoriety backgrounds were beginning to compete economically and politically with
entrenched Palestinian families. By tracing municipality elections of Nazareth, Hafia, and
Nablus, Mahmoud Yazbak has shown that, “individuals from upcoming families had made their
way to top positions in administrative institutions in general and municipalities in particular.
New faces worked their way to the top of local societies”.73 This mobilization was supported by
new educational services that could be found within Palestine.
The second notable dimension is that while municipalities were growing, the Muslim and
religious-spatial frame of Palestine was integrated within this new emerging political sphere.
Like most of the modern world religion and its connection to society also modernized. This was
true for Islam and its connections to politics and society within the Ottoman Empire. This gives
context to the changes within Palestine leading up to the Mandate. This context also serves as a
contrast to how the British Mandate envisioned Palestine and through placing their ZionistChristian ideology within the Mandate radically changed the trajectory of these political and
71
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social developments. Palestine in the administration was changing and the institutions both
cultural and political were changing with them. However, scholars like Ruth Kark would argue
these developments were due to imported modernity. This imported modernity as Kark refers
are, “new institutions [that] did not have its roots in the Muslim Middle East but rather by
European, and particular French [Napoleon Code], concepts.”74 Kark is stating the municipality
was an institutional import from Europe and had no basis within the political history of the Bilad
Al-Sham. This means that modernity and the municipality could not have developed within the
region without the West’s institution intervention. Jens Hassen claims this orientalist language
has, “inoculated urban research, especially on Palestine... [as] … scholarship continued to deploy
‘folklorist … religious, or patrimonial approaches,’ on outmoded and doomed-to-disappear urban
heritage: guilds and suqs, timeless religious communities and their sacred places or the
honeycombed features of domestic architecture and urban morphology”.75 Hessen’s argument
here is that orientalist historians have couched cities in the Bilad Ash-Sham and the Maghrib in
typologist framework of Islamic stagnation. Islam did in fact play a major role in the
development of Arab cities within an updating administrative structure. The contention here in
the literature is that orientalist scholars have seen the city within the Bilad Al-Sham historically
as under-developed to the modernized city in Europe and essentialized in an Islamic and
traditionalized frame.76 Again, this under-modernization is a subtle historiographical argument
that modernism that could have only generated from the West. And thus, rather than seeing
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developments within the socio-political sphere, the mental construction of the city in Palestine
has been seen as non-innovative. This historiographical turn has been played out in
contemporary academic spaces but also had hold within the Mandate system, which itself is seen
through the guise of urban development and archaeology. In the next section the cross section of
waqf and politics will be further explored as an example of the dual change of religious form and
politics within the Ottoman Empire.

3.3.3 Waqf
Within much of Muslim history, and particularly within Bilad al-Sham, waqf has played a
central role in the intersection of urban development, religious and social life, and providing
amenities to the populations like hospitals, bath houses (hammam), and food charities. As the
burgeoning bureaucratic system was taking hold within Palestine waqf became a place where
new politicians advocated for new localized policies. The Palestinian Arabic newspaper Filistin
ran a story of summarized points from Nasib Affendi al-Khatib's letter of announcing his
Parliamentary run in February 1912. Al-Khatib was the head of the Customs of Jaffa and the
summary of his announcement highlights some interesting Imperial policies he would propose if
elected. Al-Khatib proposed to end the musha’ land system and redistribute the land to the
fellahin77, while advocating for an absolution of all the debts they own. He also advocated for an
update to the tax system basing it on land purchasing. Other policies he offered were based on
localization of taxes and public works. He proposed taxes collected in Jerusalem should be used
for local education, and public works like roads and communication. Furthermore, he argued
that, like the Christians of Palestine, tithe money sent from the waqf system in Palestine should
stay within Palestine to benefit those who live there.78
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Al-Khatib was not the only Palestinian who held some of these positions. A young
politician from Gaza, Sa’is Abu Khadra, also sent Filistin his announcement for the running of a
Parliamentary seat in the same year. He also advocated for more local autonomy over the waqf
system within Gaza. This is because the centralized government in Istanbul wanted to maintain
control of the tax funds collected from the awqaf in which they could then redistribute to the
vilayas. He promised that he would attempt to form a coalition to pass legislation giving local
millet councils control of each sect’s awqaf and can use them directly within the local council’s
community.79 What these parliamentary election announcements indicate is that Al-Khatib and
Abu-Khadra saw localization as a central policy that the Ottoman Empire should move forward
with. In one-way waqf was a central policy for this localization. Waqf here is seen as an
additional function of local development beyond the charity dimension that is often attributed to
the institution. It also shows that waqf was seen as a beneficial institution within the lager region
of Palestine rather than just Jerusalem, especially if politicians are running on a platform like
this. Additionally, this indicates that waqf was a central socio-political institution within Ottoman
Palestine beyond a single millet, and the desire to update and change the institution shows that
the system was not stagnant but modifiable.
Localization was not the only condition that helped prompt a change within socio-cultural
and political situation within Palestine during this period. Much like the Imperial Minister of
Waqf, Elmalili Muhammed (elected in 1920), advocated for the cultural and civil need for the
waqf institution, Hajji Raghib al-Khalidi argued in an article entitled, “The Islamic Colleges,”
that Jerusalem needs an Islamic College akin to the Al-Azhar in Cairo. This desire was more
than just merely education, but a piece of a larger project. Supporting this, Al-Filistin ran articles
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on the need for local higher Islamic education for the region in the summer of 1911. After the
Haram al-Sharif Incident of 1911 local Muslims rightly feared a losing of control on their
cultural and societal hold on the city and Palestine in general. The Haram al-Sharif Incident was
an event in which the Zionist archaeological organizations Palestine Exploration Fund (British)
and the Ecole Biblique et Archeologique attempted to conduct a dig at the Al-Buraq/Walling
Wall. This created a response from Palestinians within the city in protest towards these
organizations, but also from notables within Jerusalem. Both Al-Khalidi and Sa’id Al-Husayni
(future head of the Supreme Muslim Council) in the same year articulated to the Ottoman
Parliament that Zionist encroachments were dangerous to Palestine.80
Al-Khalidi saw that in order to protect Palestine from external penetration was through
Islamic education but also local control of waqf. Al-Khalidi, in order to achieve this project,
argued that lands in Jerusalem and outside of the city needed to be purchased and endowed.
Thus, functionally and legally would not allow Palestinian land to be bought or sold.81 Said alHusayni advocated for the university and the growth of ulema in Palestine in the Spring of 1914
on the Parliamentary campaign trail. He stated that an Islamic university in Jerusalem could
serve local Muslims in the region and thus strengthening Islam in that region. This university
was eventually founded on January 28th, 1915 and was named ‘Salahiyya College’ (al-Kulliya
al-Salahiyya). It served Jerusalem and the wider region of Bilad Ash-Sham. In 1916 sixty-five
students applied to Salahiyya from Damascus alone.82
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Waqf was seen as important institution within Palestine by the new bureaucracy, and the
ulema class. They saw the localization of Palestinian institutions and politics important to the
future of Palestinians leading up to WWI. Waqf was a part of this localization. Through the
localization of waqf Palestinians could address local issues more effectively. From the standpoint
of the emerging Parliamentarians, they saw waqf as a social institution that provided service to
Palestinians. Waqf being defined within a more social institutional way did not divorce it from its
religious function. Localization provided the means of these institutions having a more direct
function of benefit within the communities and urban areas they operate. The language of
localization also indicates that Palestinians saw themselves as a political unit that wanted direct
benefits from the institution within the supra-political structure. More study needs to be done on
how effective this later goal was, but it indicates a certain shift in the political and social life of
Palestinians at the time.

3.4 Conclusion
Through a changing political zeitgeist, localization was a central theme of Palestinian
politics leading up to WWI. This localization was supported by the idea of localizing the waqf
system. The transformation of the society in Palestine at the advent of WWI was one of drastic
change where Palestinians were experiencing an opening of society and politics. This opening
effected the relationship Palestinians had with their institutions. Through educational and
administration changes allowing political participation reordered, in part, how the Palestinians
saw their built political and institutional environment in new ways. This allowed them to view
the institution of waqf within their context as an integral part of their experience and therefore,
desired more local control of it. This relationship to institution and societal change would be
abruptly changed as the British Mandate set in as the new hegemony was taking hold. This
change will be discussed over the next two chapters grounding the discussion within urban
47

development and archaeology. They were key regimes in which the British and British Mandate
institutions functioned within Palestine and how they changed the fabric of Palestinian society
through the promotion of a Zionist zeitgeist.
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3. The British Official Mind and the Zionist-Christian ideology
towards Palestine
3.1 Introduction
Throughout the 19th century, major Imperial powers were improving the way in which
they governed. The British Empire expanded what they were considering as their realms of
governance and areas of interest. These Imperial motives supported the building of what is
understood to be as an “official mind” of the Empire. The ‘official mind’ of the British Empire is
the language and rationalizations that informs the actions within the Empire system. One
example is what Daniel Goliard states as: “removing the blanks on the map” in Africa but more
importantly within the region in what would become the “Middle East.”83 In the Middle East the
Empire’s goal was to render this geography known and was formed through their vantage point
as an Imperial power couched in a Zionist-Christian and Modernist lens.
This chapter lays out further the Zionist-Christian modernist ideology within the British
Imperial ‘official mind’ power leading up to the Mandate in Palestine. This ideological
framework informed how the Mandate officials viewed Palestine and their actions as Mandate
officials. Additionally, this chapter functions as a background to subsequent chapters for looking
at waqf within Palestine under the British. This chapter is divided into three sections that
describe the different facets of the British Official Mind. The first section deals with the
definition of Zionist-Christian modernism. The termism functions as a framework to view the
Imperial actions during the Mandate. The second section deals with Victorian and Edwardian
global visions which shows how the British imbued their Christian and modernist ideology
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within Imperial action. The third and last section shows how Zionism functioned as part of this
British ideology.

3.2 The Official Mind in the British Empire
The following discussion will trace the development of the “official mind” throughout the
later part of 1800s to WWI. This ‘official mind’ here will primarily deal with how the British
viewed Palestine and the larger region, how the Empire understood its goals in the region, and
conceptions of proper societal flourishing. The appeal to the ‘official mind’ allows for the
analysis of motives of the British Empire within Palestine and how these actions effected the
built environment of Palestine.
In 1961 Ronald Robinson and John Callager published a book on British Imperial history
in Africa. This book, as G. N. Uzoigwe has claimed, “... [the authors] enthroned the strategic
factor as the overriding determinant of British advances during the year of the European
conquest of Africa.”84 The Robinson and Callager’s book is primarily centered around what they
call “the official mind of imperialism,” or the “the papers left by the policies makers’ at
Downing Street,” and the language that informs those papers. The language within the “official
mind” is the thoughts and beliefs that color and give motive to those papers and thus the actions
from which these papers generated. Uzoigwe argues that the “official mind” does not develop in
a vacuum. The way British officials thought about themselves and the world around them
affected how their policies were enacted and, in some cases, why they were created in the first
place.85 He claimed that the ‘official mind’, “was conditioned by the imperialism of merchants,
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soldiers, missionaries, travelers and administrators on the spot, and more significantly by the
collapse of indigenous African institutions under the impact of these forces.”86 When looking at
Palestine the conceptualization of the ‘official mind’ takes form in a similar but also in
importantly diverted ways. In Palestine local institutions were placed under control of and folded
within the Mandate system. This divorced the local population, and their institutions from
previous meanings of hegemonic governance. The change of the way institutions behaved were
changed by the new ways the meanings of governance the Mandate brought.
When discussing Imperial policies in the Middle East and more specifically Palestine,
academics tend to either divorce or incorporate the discussion of the ‘official mind’ within their
work. Two clear examples of this are Martin, and Aida Asim Essaid’s Zionism and Land Tenure
in Mandate Palestine. The first example of this is Martin Burton’s Colonial Land Policies in
Palestine 1917-1936. He recounts a narrative of Imperial haphazardness. By centering his
sources mostly on Foreign Office records and Zionist records, Martin Burton’s rendering of the
‘official mind’ was one of separated development and was “... ad hoc and makeshift,
multidirectional and inconsistent, even contradictory.”87 This places the motives of the British
and the agency of their actions into the plane of the unknowable. This renders the culpability of
the British’s actions null in void. The second example is Aida Asim Essaid’s Zionism and Land
Tenure in Mandate Palestine. Essaid on the other hand argues that “…the land tenure system in
Palestine, as set up by the British Government, allowed Zionism to take and active and
collaborative role in every stage of the land tenure system…,” thus arguing the ad hoc nature of
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the colonial policies in Palestine were not haphazard. Rather, the British Imperial officials acted
within a certain framework and motivation in Palestine.

3.2.1 Defining Christian Zionist Modernist Ideology
This section deals within defining the British Empire’s Zionist-Christian Modernism.
This Zionist-Christian modernist ideology was a framework in which saw Palestine as the
seedbed of a future nation-state guided by a theological and political understanding of the Jewish
right to nationhood. To begin with, the term Zionism within the study is to be understood as both
a political body of European Jews and the nationalism that sought to establish a Jewish state
within the world. This as Eyak Chowers sates, “it [Zionism] promised both material and spiritual
transformation: a modernized economy of and for the Jews, which would eliminate their
threatened, fleeting patterns of survival as well as their dependent occupational structure (which
often left them socially backward), and the revival of the Hebrew language, which would launch
a secular, fresh cultural experiment and introduce new substance into the Jewish collective
identity.”88 In other words, Zionism at its heart is a nationalist ideology.
The Christian-Zionism line of thought is more subversive as it is a supportive-nationalist
ideology of Zionism. This ideology is a particular view of its Christian theological and
traditional heritage which sees Jews as a chosen people through a particular exegetical tradition
developed in Scotland by John Darby (18 November 1800 – 29 April 1882). His theological
position called dispensationalism sees the Christians as a momentary dispensing as the spiritual
body of Israel. In the end days this spiritual body is to be displaced by a political body through
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the re-instatement of a Jewish state. Within this ideology Christians are to be “theologically
motivated [to] belief that the Jewish people have, by divine grant, the right to possess and inhabit
the land promised to them in the Hebrew Bible and that it is therefore the duty of Christians to
support this claim.”89 These two ideologies converged within late Britain Victorian political
culture as interdependent claims and support for a Jewish state.90 Thus, when referring to
Zionist-Christian ideology within the British Mandate, it is reference to this duality as this
ideology was important to the British within the colonial state-building of Palestine for the
Zionists.
The religious-political language of Zionist-Christian was supported by modernist
understandings of the state and nation. At its base value, modernity is defined as the emergence
of a nationhood bound within a state guided by an industrialist sense of capital. In particular,
“modernity, is to describe the process of capitalist expansion, development and globalization
through which the non-Western becomes Western.”91 Even though modern powers sought to
create the West in Palestine, the couching of a national spirit was an additional part of this
formulation. The understanding that the Zionist Jews are a people without home presented
Britain an additional condition within their own modernization processes. The United Kingdom
was becoming more defined within this modern nation-state framework and having another
nation as they saw it within their borders detracted from their process within modernity. The
British saw the Zionist/Jewish population as already in this process but could not manifest it
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fully. The support for a Zionist nation state would allow for this manifestation of modernity to
become fully realized as obtaining a national spirit within the framework of the state was a
necessary condition of modernization.
Therefore, it is not enough to principally define British ideology as only ZionistChristian, as one of the central goals of the Mandate was to produce a nation-state. This ideology
is particularly important for understanding how the British and Mandate Officials acted within
Palestine. The main goal of the British Mandate at large was to set up nation-states within their
protectorates. Within Palestine, this state-building mission was informed by a Zionist nationstatehood and a Christian ideology that saw Palestine as fundamentally Jewish, and the Arab and
Ottoman heritage of Palestine was in the way of this perceived reality.
Within the thesis this particular ideology will be seen within the praxis of the British’s
Department of Archaeology as the discipline within Palestine was to support the material culture
of this ideological claim. This is the process of antiquitizing Palestine. The Mandate through
unearthing a material culture of ancient relics and artifacts was done to support the Jewish
nationhood claim. This claim was part and parcel to the claim of a nation-state through state
building. The British DOA through rediscovering the past Jewishness of Palestine could build on
top of it a modernized present of national continuum; the Jewish historical past should inform the
modern Jewish present under the Mandate. The following two sections will further show this
ideology.
3.2.2 Christian-based Ideological Visions
The Victorian (1837-1901) and Edwardian (1901-1914) eras of foreign policies and
Imperial actions were constructed through a Christian/Western vision couched in modernist
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philosophy, free trade capitalism, and Imperial security. John Fisher’s work on British “power
projection” highlights the long tradition of Imperial desires for capital and control in the Middle
East region.92 Within their ‘power projection’, the British saw its goal in this region as a revival
force of the reemergence of a flourishing biblical landscape through development of agriculture
and infrastructure. This was a major influence on the ‘official mind’ as capital acclimation was
only a singular part within their reasoning for expansion within the Middle East. In
Mesopotamia, the region defined by the British as the Biblical “Tigris and Euphrates,” British
sought capital in oil in addition to the desire to see the land revived to the glory days of the
Babylonian Empire (612 B.C.E).93 This regional planning scheme hinged on the antiquitizing of
subjected lands and the modernization of those lands. These antiquitizing measures for the
British meant the returning of a region to a state of origin and then recreating a modernism from
that region’s antiquity. Beginning within the Victorian era, this planning and capital acquisition
scheme was central, “... to promote British commercial hegemony, and with it ‘enterprise,
progress, and civilization,’ to regenerate the ossifying Ottoman Empire”.94 The key here is that
the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire was principally the British view of the Ottoman Empire
as weak and underdeveloped. This paternalism and desire to correct the wrongs of the Ottoman
Empire and the lands and people they held as subjects were only going to be saved if the powers
of Europe could revitalize them.
This ideology was supported by the growing cartographical industry in Britain. Daniel
Foliard’s Dislocating the Orient, on British mapmaking of the Middle East from 1854-1921
shows three concrete themes of the map making process. Power, development, and
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culturalization of the Middle East were central in the creation process of map making. Foliard
argues that map making from 1854-1921 shows British imaginations were “...built on a
substantial Victorian and Edwardian legacy, subsumed into modern modes of imperial
governance.”95 Maps played a crucial role within the “chimera” of British Imperialism in the
Middle East. Foliard shows, even though this chimera changed over time, maps were used as “an
instrument in a wider process of disciplining that space, and therefore, shaped what happened to
that space.”96 Within the Victorian era, map making of the Palestinian geography was both
drawn in British atlases as both modern and ancient but, “The ancient often masked the
modern.”97 This imagination saw the Middle East as principally a biblical landscape and not a
modernizing Arab and Ottoman region98. Edwardian period was informed by, “Early traces of a
modernized and secularized imagination [coexisting] with a persistent biblical perspective,”
because, “British Orientalism was not one, but many. It drew on 18th-century traditions, and only
reluctantly did it incorporate new data.”99
Thus, the ‘official mind’ of the Edwardian era was conditions by the foundations of
Victorian paternalism and orientalization of the Middle East through a Christian lens. The
geopolitical system was shifting into John Darwin calls a “commercial republic.” The city of
London at the turn of the twentieth century was no longer merely the political center of the
empire, it had also become the center of global capital and finance.100 So much so, by 1913 the
British economy grew “ten-fold” from 1850-1913 and “the ratio of exports to gross domestic
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product grew by 25%.101 This ‘commercial republic’ grounded in free trade capitalism extended
beyond the coffers of Whitehall, and by the beginning of WWI 4,000 million sterling was in
foreign assets with the majority of these assets existing outside of Europe. Additionally, by 1913,
44% of the world total of foreign investment was in British hands.102 This amount of external
capital made Britain rather influenced by how the global market faired, but it also conditioned
the economic and pollical policies of Britain in and into the inter-war period (1919-1939).
These capital gains created the ability for both the Imperial state and the civilian
economic sectors to take advantage of surplus of the capital gained by Britain. One of these areas
was the Middle East and through the lens of “development” this region and others could be
integrated into this global market.103 In Palestine specifically this mode of what is termed “metaeconomic” control. ‘Meta-economic’ control was the mode in which the British planned and
controlled a region through development to fit better a “commercial future.”104 Jacob Noris’s
study on Palestine’s economic development during the colonial period 1905-1948 highlights the
‘meta-economic’ nature of Britain in Palestine and the greater Middle East105. Noris’s argument
is that “... Palestine needs to be viewed within a wider sphere of interconnected British interests
in the new ’Middle East’, but such a sphere remained a distinct sub-district within a global
empire of territorially disconnected units”.106 This global and ‘meta-economic’ policy on the
back of Victorian visage is principally how the British enacted policy in Palestine. The British
Prime Minster Lloyd Gorge (r. 1916-1922) who held the Zionist assumption of the revival of
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Palestine into its Hebrew and biblical past was informed by his Victorian education.107 Karin
Loevyhas recently shown and re-assessed key documents leading up to the Mandate and shows
that the framework of nationalism, developmentalism, and state-building legal framework were
central to the Mandate systems. This was true, especially, for the British Mandate system in
which Palestine was constructed from an Ottoman Imperial regional jurisdiction into a
Weberian/Westphalian state system couched in the language of returning the land to its former
biblical glory and in the promise of a national home for the Jews; the Jewish state and their
patronage was central to this function.108 The Christian and modernist parts of the British
ideology within their ‘official mind’ supported each other. The Imperial goals for the Middle
East were conditioned by their envisioning of the Middle East and in the next section the Zionist
part of this ideology is discussed fuller.

3.2.3 Zionism
This section looks at the ways in which British Imperialism and Zionism towards Palestine
developed and supported each other. The section focuses more on the enshrinement of the
Balfour Declaration and the connection of Zionist policy to British policy in Palestine. While this
thesis is not a study on Zionism proper, but it is important to point to the ways in which Zionism
and its ideology played a strong role within the ‘official mind’ of the Mandate. Zionism and
Zionists had direct effects on the Imperial policies of economics of “developmentalism,” and
state-building within Palestine.109 The argument here is that the goals of the British Empire for
Palestine were in line with and directly supportive of the Zionist movement and cause.
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The first area of connection between Zionism and Empire is through the officials of the
British Empire. The Zionist movement and its connection within the British Imperial system was
not only through Arthur Balfour, but also through the future High Commissioner of the Mandate
Herbert Samuel. In particular, Herbert Samuel on the eve of WWI begun to lobby the British
Cabinet with great success. Prior to these efforts, the Zionist movement had lobbied many
European governments to aid in their colonial project, but Samuel was the person able to secure
this support. In connecting with Imperial desires and strategies, Samuel on November 9th, 1914,
told Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey that the Ottoman Empire was soon to be broken up and
Palestine would be an important geopolitical stronghold. The latter was detailing the security of
the Imperial state in the region and in particular the Suez Canal110. Samuel carefully wrote
another memorandum in March 1915 to the Cabinet in which the significance of the Arab
population in Palestine was heavily underplayed. Adel Safty argues that this created became a
habit of deceit and manipulation in which the British would become a “protectorate over
Palestine” and support the political goals of the Zionist movement. In order for this to happen
Safty states that, “the Zionists would couch their ambitions in language carefully designed to
appeal to their audience’s imperialism, religious beliefs, sentimentalism and even antiSemitism111.”
British policy in the Middle East would become protectionist and developmentalist during
and after WWI and grounded in a settler colonial project.112 Even though Adel Safty’s argument
of deceit and manipulation may have grounding, it is also worth noting that the Imperial
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objectives aligned with the Zionist motives. These motives as mentioned earlier were grounded
in an ideology that predisposed them to follow the Zionist movement in its mission.
Through reassessing British documents and sentiments of Zionism during WWI and into the
early 1920s, William M. Mathew effectively shows that Palestine was more than just a mere
second thought in the minds of the British Imperial elite.113 The Suez Canal, French activity in
the region, and a Zionist Palestine as an Imperial strategic move as a duality of British security
and having a Westernized vassal state in the region.114 The Zionist movement and the British
Imperial system worked symbiotically as an Imperial unit. Sir John Shuckburgh, Sir Gilbert
Clayton (chief secretary for Herbert Samuel in Palestine), Llyod George, Lord Curzon, and again
Hebert Samuel commented on the significance of Palestine as the hub for the Empire and
region’s security. Samuel in his memoir, published in 1945, stated, “The moment Turkey entered
the war the position was entirely changed. If Palestine was to be given a new destiny, Great
Britain, with her important strategic interests in the Middle East, was directly concerned,”
connecting to his memorandum in 1915. The territory, crucially, ’bordered on the Suez
Canal”.115 The Suez and Egypt were crucial to the British Imperial system as it was both a
commercial hub and the Indian trade route. On July 1922 Winston Churchill, appointed as the
head of the Colonial Office in February 1921, stated in the House of Commons in London in July
1922:
“I am bound to ask the Committee to take the vote which is about to be given as a vote of
confidence, because we cannot carry out our pledges to the Zionists, with which the House is
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fully familiar, unless we are permitted to use Jews, and use Jews freely, within what limits are
proper, to develop new sources of wealth in Palestine. … I say Palestine is all the more
important to us I say that Palestine is all the more important to us in view of what is happening,
in view of the ever-growing significance to the British Empire of the Suez Canal; and I do not
think £1,000,000 a year ... would be too much for Great Britain to pay for the control and
guardianship of this great historic land, and for keeping the word she has given before all the
nations of the world116.”

Thus, when the Balfour declaration was enshrined within the Mandate’s protectorate function
these words became de facto realpolitik and Weltpolitik. Zionism was more than just a
movement within the British Imperial system but a symbiotic tool of mutual goal seeking.
Zionist activity in Palestine prior to the Mandate was informed most by their ideological
developments between the first two waves (1881-1903 and 1904-1914) of colonial migration to
Palestine. These migrations movements were grounded within nationalization and state-building
language and would fluctuate between a religious and nation-state ideology. This fluctuation
would on one hand argue for nationhood in Palestine but on the other hand talk about economic
opportunities within Palestine. By 1914 ,Palestine had been the single largest migration area for
the Zionists; the same year Samuel advocated for British tutelage and cooperation. Alexis
Ruppin was one of the main figures who helped the Zionist movement to achieve this settlement.
Ruppin combined a nationalization economic structure within a capitalist production motif
arguing this would bring forth economic prosperity to the Zionist movement within Palestine.
This would also bring forth an answer to their question of land ownership. As capital was gained
into a national sense, they could then claim more land through purchasing and then beginning the
cycle over. Zionist land and capital would bring more capital.117 Through placing themselves
under the suzerainty of the British Empire this cycle could be made indefinite.
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Zionists also saw themselves as agents of progress within Palestine. This progress for
many of the Zionist fold was one of production and the eventual modernization of Palestine
away from its Arab past. Zionists leading up to the Mandate in Palestine saw their role in this
budding progressive ideology primarily in agriculture. Dana von Suffrin states that , “As a
proponent of Practical Zionism which strove to attain Zionist goals through practical means such
as colonialization and working the land, [Otto] Warburg made it clear that improving the
productivity of Palestinian agriculture was just as important as his mission civilizatrice
(civilizing mission)…118” This civilizing mission exemplified in Warburg was a part of the
greater Zionist motive to economically develop Palestine through, “modern technology and
science119.” This language applies back into the European mode of “improvement colonialism”
in that, “people, objects, and the natural world were to meant to be administered by those who
were in a position to read the laws of nature120.” Thus, the Zionist ideological position was as
much colonial and European as its suzerain. The Zionist movement saw itself as a part of the
society which brings about the modernization of those who are not yet modernized. Only through
a continued Zionist settlement would bring further progress to this goal in Palestine. The
national-myth that was developing and becoming more concretely engrained within the
movement was aided by an orientalism that ultimately saw the Arab population as
underdeveloped and not native to the landscape.
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3.3 Conclusion
The discussion above describes the British’s Christian-Zionist modernist ideology of the
‘official mind’ of the Mandate era. British Imperial motives were guided by a Zionist-Christian
ideology which saw Palestine as fundamentally the home of the Jewish people. Through statebuilding, the British Empire could revive a Jewish homeland as a modern nation-state. The
commitment to a Christian-modernist ideology in the Imperial ‘official mind,’ and the support of
Zionist action within the region indicates guided Imperial actions and not haphazardness, as the
literature has previously pointed to. Thus, the British Empire acted within Palestine in what John
Darwin calls an “Octopus of Power” and as Uzoigwe describes as non-vacuous. The Mandate in
the beginning years of the Mandate took hold of this non-vacuous ideology and enshrined it as
the mechanism of state-building for the Zionist project in Palestine. This framework then will be
important for evaluating Mandate actions within Palestine as it provides an analytical lens to see
these actions with purpose and ideological motivation. The Zionist and British Imperial ideology
were not simply individual actors but rather partners in the same state-building project of
Palestine as the next chapter will demonstrate concretely using urban development regimes as a
case study.
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4. Urban Development in Palestine under the British Mandate
4.1 Introduction
Urban development plays an important role in the physical, social and political
organization of cities. The planning and development of cities within imperial or colonial
contexts are oftentimes conditioned to be beneficial to those who are in power. The envisioning
of cities and urban areas played crucial roles in this relationship. This chapter seeks to show how
the development of urban policy of the British Mandate supported nascent and growing Zionist
and British colonial urban development. I show how Arab populations used institutions they
have utilized historically, whereas Zionist settlers and the British Mandate utilized European and
English forms of urban development and planning. This chapter articulates how waqf was placed
under the changing modes of what constituted as urban and how the urban development ideology
of the Mandate officials was a site of contention. Urban development within the understanding of
the Mandate officials was a regime of control and reconstitution. Waqf was one urban institution
that was placed between these two modes of urban development. In one sense the British
Mandate urban development structure conditioned waqf to adapt from a socio-religious
institution into an institution of realpolitik. This is not to say that waqf historically did not have
political function, but within the context of the British Mandate waqf evolved within the context
and opposition to the Mandate’s politics and objectives.
This chapter will compare the urban development policies and intellectual concepts of the
city of ‘the interior space and exterior space’ of Mandate Palestine. The chapter is divided into
two sections. The first section details the urban planning regimes of the Mandate. This section
shows how cities were view and shaped by the British and Mandate officials. This section details
first, the passing of the Town Planning Act of 1921 and how this act modified how cities
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functioned within the Mandate. The second sub-section deals with the figure Patrick Geddes,
who was hired by both the Mandate and Zionist organizations to propose and impose Town
Planning schemes all over Palestine. The second section deals with the creation of the Supreme
Muslim Council and the reforming of waqf through the centralized waqf system under the
Mandate.

4.2 Urban Development through British Planning in Palestine
Urban development was one of the ways in which the British through the Mandate enacted
their state-building efforts. The Mandate powers through instituting local governments and
designing the apparatus of control to benefit certain designated groups, urban landscapes were
envisioned and developed conditioned by how the landscapes were governed and managed.121
The three main ways the Mandate used and refined the urban fabric of Palestine was through
essentialization, their commitment to Zionism, and the localization of these town planning
schemes. This section then explores these aims in connection with the town planning schemes in
Palestine.
One of the first aims of the town planning scheme was looking at the city within Palestine
through an essentialized lens. Essentialism within this context is the way in which something is
viewed within a concrete and understood form. Meaning, anything in which can be studied or
known in an essentialized way must be that way because that thing has an objective essence.
This essence of something can be understood within any context, and it still function and be
understood within the same way in another context. The city within the Mandate was one of
these essentialized things. The Mandate saw the city in a dual sense of Arab and Jewish. The
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Arab city had certain characteristics which was predefined by a historical and Orientalized
knowledge of the city. This caused the city within the Arab context to become a type among
other kinds of city. This contrast of a western and modern city the traditional and Arab city was
derived from the British and Mandated ideology. The British and Mandate officials articulated
also that places like Jerusalem and other important Jewish sites of antiquity were also essentially
Jewish lending to their ideological commitments. The Jewish essentialized nature of the city was
privileged, as will be shown in much fuller detail in the next chapter, over any other
conceptualizations of the city.
Vincent Lemire’s recent work, Jerusalem 1900: The Holy City in the Age of Possibilities,
connects this concept of essentialization of Jerusalem to the historiography of Jerusalem from
the Western perspective. Lemire states, in connection to the British ‘official mind’, that the
essentialism within the mind of the orientalist of the city of Jerusalem was, “... [an] image of an
immovable city, frozen in its traditions and fragmented by irreconcilable religious conflicts.”122
Jerusalem at the turn of the 20th century in the minds of many British and Europeans lay between
an envisioned past of a real biblical city that was hindered by the subjection of the current
“Islamic city.”123 When in reality the city, the relation of people to the city, and society within
the city was in great flux. Lemire articulates these two different realities of how the city was
lived in at the turn of the 20th century verses a Zionist and Christian conceptualization of the city
by Westerners. Through sourcing Ottoman and Arab archives, and travel guides Lemire has
shown that the city in 1900 was heterogenous in makeup and not broken down by confessional
identities as the early British travelers and cartographers imagined.124 The make-up of the city
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did not break down, as Lemire argues, until the 1930s. Christians, Jews, and the Muslim
population shared the city and where British cartography deemed “Muslim”, “Jew”, ”Christian”,
or ”Armenian” was in reality a construction of the orientalist imagining of despair and shock of
an imaged Zionist-Christian city that was not there. This despair was canonized in the ‘official
mind’ through typology, cartography, and archaeology.125 This canonization was applied into the
urban developmental framework of emerging Garden Cities and important historical Jewish
cities within Palestine through both the Mandate officials and Zionist colonial-settlers. Concepts
of stagnation of “Islamic cities” and underdevelopment conditions were justifications for
Mandate’s machinery to marry a framework of development to the “cementification” of cities.
From a supra-structural ideology, the space and built environment within the cities became a
place of contestation in the of civitas and meaning.
Land purchasing, private ownership, and Zionist ideological urban development were
ideologically tied into one conceptualization of the Mandate and Zionist capital ownership within
Palestine. This ideology was juxtaposed to the conventionalization of the Arab “renterism” and
“primitive” urban development within the official mind of the Mandate personnel.126 The
“Garden City” stood in contrast to the stagnant and claustrophobic “Arab City”. This ideological
bifurcation in effect created what Trounstine calls the “geography of inequality”.127 Trounstine
articulates that inequality arises within the geography of cities are o

ften derived from how

urban development is enacted. Through the privileging of the Zionist archetype within this
dichotomy the Mandate officials operated out of a predisposed position in favor of the Zionist
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project aiding in state-building practices. Mark Levine, in the context of Jaffa and Tel Aviv,
states that “[the] fundamental feature of the discourses of urban modernism and modernization,
constitute[ed] an ‘aesthetic of erasure and reinscription’ that is at the heart of modern ideologies
of planning and development”.128 As will be shown within the Town Planning schemes of
Geddes in Jerusalem this ‘aesthetic of erasure and reinscription’ was applied also within
archaeological regimes in Palestine aiding in the reacting of Palestine as a Zionist landscape.
Inequality within the archaeological regimes were produced by the Mandate’s aims if crafting
Palestine within their Zionist-Christian ideology. Thus, the British’s rule of Palestine and the reconstruction necessitated some form of control within the urban space as a means for the statebuilding objectives. These objectives were conditioned by the political motives of the Zionist
settlers and the Mandate officials which in turn also the subjugated Palestinians and Palestinian
cities within the Mandate.129

4.2.1 The Town Planning Act of 1921
The Town Planning Act of 1921 defined town planning and urban development within
the early part of the British Mandate and helped to facilitate localized development motifs. These
motifs were enshrined within the mechanism of the Mandate, as the goal of establishing a Jewish
national home was central the policies of the British Mandate. Localized urbanism thus helped
These conceptualizations of modern and primitive are arguably based on the emergence of the “official mind”
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the Mandate to see anything Muslim/Arab as primitive and backward. Ideological pre-dispositions conditioned the
urbanism of the Mandate and how the Mandate would attempt to re-create the landscape of the Mandate in its own
ideological image . Mark LeVine, Overthrowing Geography, pp. 16
129
Barbara J. Smith has shown how economic policies within the British Mandate facilitated segregation of the Arab
and Jewish populations from the beginning of the Mandate. Thus, on two fronts helped to construct the partitioning
of Palestine under the British through a developmentalism in preference of the Zionists. Barbara J. Smith,
Separation in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920-1929 (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse: 1993).
128

68

Zionist migration into Palestine take footing, but also helped Zionist urban planners to create
spaces of “Zion” in the guise of European modernity. Zionism within the context of urban
development was a force of “re-creation” and not only “settlerism”. Rather than merely resettling
within the confines of Palestine, Jewish settlers and Mandate officials helped to officiate a
recreation of Palestinian geography and urban landscape into modern Jewish-European ethos.
The Town Planning Ordinance of 1921 helped to facilitate this even though the Mandate
powers opted for a de-centralized local urban development rather than more centralized urban
development. However, the Ordinance gave the High Commissioner (at the time Herbert
Samuel) considerable oversight as the Commissioner was the person who appointed the TownPlanning Commission. The Central Commission had the power to reorder and create building bylaws, essentially controlling the manner and quality of the construction of new buildings and
roads. Another tool the Commission had was expropriation. Expropriation of lands had a very
wide range of applications from the construction of approved private construction projects to
state building projects the British Mandate officials would seize land if they deemed it as an
infringement on the new buildings or for preservation of perceived archaeological importance.
For instance, the Mandate officials used eminent domain in multiple cases to seize waqf
land for their projects. In Jerusalem previously demarcated Greek Orthodox waqf land was made
“available to commercial businesses and Jewish land-purchasing agencies”.130 These actions in
particular will be further articulated and shown in Chapter 5 as they were not isolated events but
were a pattern of actions the Mandate Department of Archaeology enacted. Nichols E. Roberts
remarks that after World War I and the Russian Revolution, the British Mandate expropriated the
Greek Orthodox waqf land for new developments outside of Jerusalem. Even though the British
130
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promised to protect the inalienability status of waqf, this is one indicator of the preferences of the
Mandate. This preference and decision, Roberts explains, was guided by the 1921 Town
Planning Ordinance and that “... the sale went forward because it made sense for the dual-city
plan [of Jerusalem] and for granting Zionist immigrants, who were demanding land in the city,
[and] a space to construct new neighborhoods”.131
Within this context, Robert Home articulates that the administration of High
Commissioner Herbert Samuel and Attorney-General Norman Bentwich found that the 1921
Town Planning Ordinance generated too much central control.132 The administration moved
quickly towards a process of de-centralization the urban planning commission and gave partial
control by local town planners throughout Palestine. This move was strategic as it gave other
local bodies autonomy within Palestine and allowed the central administration to have a cursory
oversight of them. The Town Planning Act of 1921 and this localization produced and
encouraged pro-Zionist urban development in Tel Aviv, Jaffa, and Haifa, and the gradual loss of
Arab control and participation in the building up of these cities. As an example, in 1910 Tel Aviv
had a population of 300 and grew to a population of 150,000 by 1937.133 This growth, as the
town planners of Tel Aviv utilized localization policies of the Mandate, effectually snuffed out
Jaffa’s ability to grow.134 This is juxtaposed to the desire to “historicize” or keep Jerusalem
within the historical mind of preserving the Holy City’s “unique” status. Thus, according to
Home, urban planning of Jerusalem was conditioned in evolution and control. The first British
urban planner of Jerusalem, William McLean, divided Jerusalem into four separate zones in
131
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which “Zone 1”, or Jerusalem, would be preserved as “medieval” and new construction would
be prohibited. The other three zones were to provide space for construction of a modern style as
“new” Jerusalem.135
The 1921 Town Planning Ordinance gave the town planners of the Mandate system and
Zionist settlers who worked with the Mandate considerable power and discretion with the built
environment. This, further highlighted in Chapter 5, helped to facilitate a growing infringement
on waqf properties and the way in which the British Mandate sought to re-cast the urban and
Palestinian geography within the building of a Zionist nation-state. The following discussion of
the biologist-town planner Patrick Geddes’ (1854-1932) ideology and the creation of The
Supreme Muslim Council (c. 1921) and will elucidate this changing fabric within Palestine
further.

4.2.2 Patrick Geddes and the Ideology of Town Planning in Palestine
Patrick Geddes was a British Imperial town planner in Palestine between 1918 and 1925.
He built on the policies William McLean, the first British town planner for Jerusalem. Geddes
worked on many of the major Palestinian cities: Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. As Noah Hysler
Rubin describes, Geddes, “[was] a planner who strove to reflect the needs and aspirations of the
local Jewish community, which, together with his employment by the Zionist movement, made
him a full associate of the Jewish homecoming”.136 Geddes’s policy was conditioned by the
“official mind” of the British Empire as described in chapter two. For Geddes, Palestine was the
seedbed for the revival of the ancient Israeli civilization in which he deemed as the originator of
Western civilization. Jerusalem was seen as an urban development experiment which sought to
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return the city to a biblical and Jewish glory as a center of “regional and cultural order” as
Zionist nation-state. The following section shows how the British ‘official mind’ informed the
way Geddes’ and in effect the British Mandate envisioned the urban fabric of Palestine. This
envisioning of Palestine within the Mandate hegemony either willingly in some cases or not in
others rendered waqf as secondary within Town Planning Schemes and within the Zionist
ideology of the Mandate itself.
The connection of evolution, biology, and social development were a central ideology
within Geddes’ conceptualization of progress. This concept of progress within society and civil
institutions are foundational to the ideas that he laid out in his most important work, City in
Evolution.137 Civics, planning, and education were all centered around his understanding of the
urban planner as the manifold of evolution within a given society. Building on a matrix of
biological and social evolution within a structure of archetypes, these ideas coalesced within the
conception of traditionalized culture and socialized evolution. For Geddes, this meant assessing
the city, or the center of society, through surveys. Through these assessments, people could be
guided towards a future which originates from a determined history, culture, and tradition.138 The
survey for Geddes was an outworking of his concept of the City Planner being a ‘gardener’.
Ameeth Vijay has remarked that garden language like cultivation was a central typology in
Geddes’ planning theory. Vijay states the language of garden for Geddes meant that, “the planner
as a gardener is responsible for tending to this [or any] garden for educating the people on their
now forgotten evolution. ... … the local ought not to be erased but instead must be cultivated,
tended to, and integrated as a site of action within universal, global conceptions of planning and
137
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evolution.”139 And thus, “... the planner carefully sees to the growth, flowering, and eventual
flowering of fruit of culture, spaces, and citizens”.140 These subjects, for Geddes, were not the
Arab but the Zionist settler coming into Palestine.141
Geddes saw Palestine as a Hebrew site covered in an Arab, Turkish, and European
“weed”. Hysler-Rubin comments on how Geddes viewed Jerusalem as being hindered by “the
many monumental institutes built by foreign empires, demand[ed] to pull down the Turkish
clock tower erected adjacent to the city walls or foreign European buildings to which he pointed
as vulgar modern decoration”.142 Thus, when surveying the Palestinian city Geddes saw the city
as underdeveloped and ‘traditional’. Where there were buildings of primarily Islamic origin (and
some European) Geddes described them as “foreign,” “ugly”, or “Turkish”. One area in
particular Geddes wished to remove in his planning of Jerusalem was the Maghrib Quarter of the
city. Geddes saw it as an obstruction to the ‘Wailing Wall’. In its place, “there would be room
for some decent cottages (I hoped Jewish) or perhaps better for some neutral building – or
policemen’s cottages.”143 What this indicates within Geddes planning ideology was the proper
way for Palestine to evolve was to cultivate the newly revived Zionist culture and state, but also
cast it as a regional center for the continued cultivation of a Zionist culture and prominence. As
Geddes himself states, “Clearly realiz[ing] this, is not once more the high function of a renewing
Zionism, to repeat the ancient message upon our modern spiral ... and to recall the ancient
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conception of Unity throughout the whole Universe,” Zionist state-building was at the center of
his Town Planning.144
Within the context of Jerusalem, Geddes constructed a museum, planned The Hebrew
University, and was a forerunner of a traveling Cities and Town Planning Exhibition. The
museum in Jerusalem retold the history of Palestine leading to the eventual manifestation of the
Zionist state. Christian and Muslim Arab history would not be neglected. However, the
foretelling of the future Zionist State within the Museum indicated a certain historical preference
of an envisioned past towards a projected future Zionist nation-state.145 This historicized
mythology was to be supported by the construction of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
Geddes saw this university’s goal as a Westernization and Modernization project that Zionists,
who “distinctively combined Oriental and Occidental ideals”, would be the principal agent of the
project. Through the University fledging Zionist scholars would add into the language of the
nation-state myth through studies in archaeology, history, and civics.
This understanding goes hand in hand in of how he saw urban planning. The city as the
major organ of a region or of a civilization held the “national, racial, religious, human...” spirit of
that region and civilization. Geddes understood that when “cities evolve and we must ensure that
they evolve in sustainable ways”.146 This evolution through the guidance of the planner ought to
preserve the connection to the antiquitized past as in that past lays the origin of that past. Zionist
state-building within the Mandate for Geddes meant that a Zionist past could factually and
objectively realized. Thus, with Jerusalem he saw that through urban planning and education
Jerusalem could be refashioned into a Zionist stronghold. Geddes planned to construct “new
144
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cities” around the old medinas where the Zionist settlers would find residency. The old city, or
Jerusalem, was to be antiquitized and preserved by “its historical and religious sites, it was seen
as the paradigmatic holy city, the very object for which the colonial disciplines of archaeology
and historical preservation had been developed”.147 This duality of ‘new’ and ‘old’ plays a
particularly important function within Jerusalem in connection to the presence of waqf. This
relation will be further detailed in the next chapter, however, the conceptualization of ‘old’ was a
central way to historize and antiquitize Jerusalem in such a manner to allow the antiquities
regime to encroach on the rights of waqf.
To further elucidate the ‘new’ in Geddes’ planning is in his template for Tel Aviv. Being
able to start from ground zero, Geddes was able to implement his vision of a modern-Jewish
vision of the city for the new Jewish state. Even though only parts of Geddes’ plans were carried
out within the city planning of Tel Aviv, his planning further shows the ‘official mind'
within the British Mandate.148 One of the central development tools of the British Mandate and
in extension the Zionist settlers was the concept of “garden cities”. Predating the advent of the
Mandate, Zionist settlers from Europe constructed low populated cities in which were guided by
the urban planning philosophy of Ebenezer Howard. The author argued that with a city of around
32,000 inhabitants, and being centered on self-governance, society could be altered and
changed.149 M. Zaidman and R. Kark have indicated between 1905 and 1945, 127 Garden City
projects were constructed within Palestine. Even though they juxtapose a ‘clusterious’ and ‘small
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Arab city’ to the advent of the growing city biproduct of the Zionist colonies agricultural
adventures, they connect the development of Tel Aviv to the founding of the Garden City of
Ahuzat Bayit.150 In this they argue, “... [the colonists] were also aware of the fact that they were
building an urban model for a new nation. Therefore, they deliberately planned an environment
that stood out against the existing city and separated it from the city of Jaffa, by building it at
some distance from the city151.” In connecting it with British urban layouts, garden settlements
were constructed as suburbs of the central city.
The British Mandate adopted the mindset of garden city planning and Geddes’s motives
in four important ways. Robert Home states that these four ways were: (1) road improvement,
housing construction, and slum clearance through direct intervention, (2) in-direct intervention
through the employment of town planners, (3) implementing a dichotomy of reluctant (hesitant)
town planning on traditional urban societies and the desire to conserve historic cities through
stagnant ‘historization” of those cities, and (4) a cooperation of local private sectors in
combining a British paternalism in the application of urban plans like Garden Cities152. This
emerging framework of urban development within the context of a new hegemonic power
changes the way in which the Arab/Palestinian population lived within their cities. As new
structures were being mechanized, institutions and manners of being within the cities were
rapidly changing. One of these in particular is through the creation of the Supreme Muslim
Council as the following section details.
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4.3

Reforming Waqf and the Supreme Muslim Council
This section details how the British Mandate created the Supreme Muslim Council. This

organization oversaw the religious institutions of the Muslim body within Palestine. One of the
duties of this pseudo-governmental body was the oversight of the institution of waqf within the
Muslim population of Palestine. The section first aims to show how the Supreme Muslim
Council (SMC) was established and how this semi-autonomous organization operated within the
Mandate structure. The second aim is to show how the British Mandate was installing
institutions that competed within the waqf system to offer both a secularized form of waqf, but
also further means for capital gain as the section on the English Civil Trust illustrates. This
section also provides further context to the waqf system under the British as the SMC was the
principal actor when it came to waqf rights. This context will be important for Chapter five, as
the SMC was often found at the center of legal debates around the violation of waqf rights.

4.3.1 Formation of the Supreme Muslim Council Waqf
In December 1917, the British Military government in Palestine formed a centralized
committee called the Central Waqf Council/Committee (CWC).153 From the 20th to the 22nd of
November 1919, a group of six Muslim men who were involved within the waqf system met in
Jerusalem with the military government on matters of waqf in Palestine. In particular,
Muhammed Kamel Effendi El-Husseini (Grand Mufti of Jerusalem), Aref Effendi Hikmet
Nashashibi (Director General of Wakfs), Tewtik Effendi Tahbub (Mamour of Hebron Wakfs),
Nimir Effendi Hamad (Mamour Nablus Wakfs), Muhie el-Din Effendi Ab-del Shatia (Mamour
of Gaza Wakfs), Yacoub Effendi Abu Rida (Mamour of Jaffa Wakfs) Captin H.O Bennet
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(O.E.T.A Representative), and Mr. N. Abrarius (O.E.T.A Legal Secretary) were all present at
these meetings.154 Within this meeting the Arab overseers of the waqf system was discussed with
the British military government’s officials and there was an approval of funds to help repair the
damage done to Mosques and the awqaf from the war.155 J. B. Barron mentions that the decision
to create this central body was to, “...in effect, gave the financial control of wakfs to a central
body which prepared annual estimates for submission to the military authorities for their
approval... …A British Officer was nominated to assist Military Governors in their dealings with
local wakfs, the Governors having replaced District Administrative Councils which were not
convened by the Army Authorities”.156 However, the creation of this body also gave the early
British Military government oversight of the actions of the centralized waqf department.

4.3.1.1

The SMC, Waqf, and the Mandate Legal Framework

Through the organization of this body, there was a dual development of control over and
centralization of waqf. On the one hand, much like Palestinian politicians under the Young Turk
regime, Arab Muslims saw this as an opportunity for the localization that they were seeking
politically in the past decade. On the other hand, however, this local politicization was not
autonomous. Due to the British control and oversight, the centralized waqf body was only ever
semi-autonomous. This can be seen in how the law was applied within the Palestinian state and
later on how the waqf administration often had to compete with other Mandate departments for
viability. In October of 1920 the British Military government applied the 1858 Land Law Code
“Finance: Central Waqf Council,” in O.E.T.A (South), No. 9, 16th November 1919, pp. 3,4.
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of the Ottoman government on to the land regime of Palestine, however, with considerable
changes. The first of these is the adoption of leasing terms on waqf property. The Land Transfer
Ordinance of 1920 regulated all immovable property by stating,
In this ordinance and in all regulations made hereunder, unless there is something
repugnant in the context, the word “disposition” means a sale, mortgage, gift,
dedication of wakf of every description and any other disposition of immovable property
except advise by will or a lease for a term not exceeding 3 years. It includes the transfer
of mortgage and a lease containing an option by virtue the term may exceed 3 years157.

This ordinance placed on all of the land system oversight of property exchanges and concrete
lease limits. This change was important as it is an indication of the relationship of those in power
to the land. The change here is one from a relational aspect of ruler and subject within land
taxation to one of management of Mandate power and subject as in addition to the application of
Ottoman law the Mandate also applied a strict deed-registration regime.158
Secondly, immovable property (which often constituted waqf property), must have dual
registration and approval not of the central waqf administration, but the central British
administration. The person who wishes to transfer land must receive approval of their local
Governor of the District, register land title with the government, and not exceed certain area and
monetary limits, and must immediately develop the land. This leaves little room for any
discretion of circumstance for the land owner or guardian (mutawalli). Arguably, the language of
immediate cultivation and/or usage is the application and assumption of Zionist
conceptualization of production. The land which one owns, purchases, or transfers must not
exceed 3000 (Egyptian Pounds) or 300 dunams in the case of agricultural land, and 30 dunams in
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the case of urban land.159 Thus, these changes effectively curtailed the endowment freedoms that
were traditionally held under the Ottoman regime. Herbert Samuel (High Commissioner of the
Mandate) to Lord Allenby claimed that the main reason for this ordinance was that, “... private
enterprises of urgent importance cannot be started because the necessary land cannot be
acquired”.160 Thus in some manner land structurally needed to be made alienable to the
prevailing system that came prior to the World War I.
The Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) became an official body on December 19th, 1921
and was built on the policies and structure of the Central Waqf Committee. The formation of the
SMC solidified the position of waqf within the realm of religion and demarcated the institution
within that religious conceptualization as a legal framework within the Mandate itself. In an
interim report on July 30th, 1921 Herbert Samuel mentioned, based on religious liberty, that the
British Mandatory officials had constructed legal courts based on the three sectarian groupings
within the fold of the Mandate: the Jew, Orthodox Christian, and the Supreme Muslim
Council.161 These religious courts operated alongside Civil Courts within Palestine, but the
dichotomy of religious/secular was developed through their advent. The addition of the Civil
Courts offered further changes within the legal system for the Muslim population. Prior to the
Mandate, even though there were functioning civil courts, most of the administration of the
Ottoman Government still operated through the Shari’a court system.162 Under British
governance, Shari‘a courts were not autonomous. Being under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Muslim Council, the British Mandate still subjugated them under the Legal Department of the
159
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British Mandate.163 The creation of sectarian court structures allowed for was both the oversight
of the courts from the advantage point of Attorney General of the Mandate and to demarcate
sectors of the pre-British court system as “religious” and out of the framework of the civil court.
The alienation of courts was in a way to modernize the legal system of Palestine within in a
secular framework. One of these courts was the Land Court. This alienation caused a plurality
within the court system that brought cases under multiple bodies of law and regulation. If land
and waqf where the center of a legal case both the Land Court and the SMC were involved
within that case.
From this foundation, the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) had control of the shari’a
courts and in effect all of al-awqaf al-muslimiyah (Muslim Waqf). The functions of the council
are laid out in Ordinance No. 58 in the Official Palestinian Gazette on January1st, 1921. The
Council had legal control and jurisdiction over al-awqaf al-muslimiyah. The SMC control could
approve the foundation of a new waqf, appoint mutawali (managers of waqf), and if needed
dismember a waqf. Just as the courts themselves were subjected to the Mandate’s oversight, the
SMC was also supervised by the Mandate through the mandatory publishing of yearly reports on
the status of waqf within Palestine164. The Mandate developed pluralistic legal framework
grounded in a sectarianizing of the Ottoman millet system, the Mandate was a social market
within religious sects, until the 1930s where it was more grounded in national identity.165 Laura
Robson has argued that the millet system previous to the Mandate was molded into a legal
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framework of “imperial invention of ’native’ tradition and the construction of ’customary’
ethnic, cultural, and especially religious categorizations”.166 This legal conceptualization allowed
the Mandate system to craft a sentiment of ”unreadiness” of Palestinian Arabs for the “duties and
responsibilities of Western-style secular citizenship,” and are “better off under a ’traditional’
system of communal administration and personal law governed by religious texts167.” Vincent
Lemire argues that because of a long tradition of British intellectually defining Palestine as a
place of Zion and therefore Zionist, willingly ignored the rather heterogenous nature of Palestine
and Jerusalem. The millet system (the Ottoman system of governing non-Muslim populations) in
1900 developed to be more of a categorization of taxation and demographic data collection and
not hard-fast constructions of segregated space. In creating separate religious courts, the Mandate
brought under control their autonomy within the system as a whole.

4.3.2 The English Civil Trust in Palestine
Another way the Mandate created a form of institutional segregation was through the
implementation of the English Civil Trust. In 1925, the British Mandate made provisions for
non-Muslims who endowed land within the Shari’a court a legal option of transferring their
endowments into a civil charitable trust.168 The British civil/private trust ran parallel to and in
competition with the waqf system.169 The British civil/private trusts function very similarly to
166
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waqf in that the trust alienates property (moveable or immovable) for the purpose of the endower
of the trust. However, the British Trust has two major distinctions from waqf. The first is
perpetuity. The Trust is not meant to last ‘till the end of time’. The second is that the Trust is
secular in nature. Trusts are to function in some form of charity, but not within a religious
framework. This allowed for the application of trusts to be vague unlike waqf law which was
guided by a concrete legal framework.170
The usage of this British institution allowed for international sympathizers of the Zionist
cause to finance the movement within Palestine, whereas Arab’s and non-Zionist Jews continued
to use waqf and hekdesh (traditional Jewish endowment system)171. Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow
argues that ,“Jewish Palestinian [immigrant Zionists] use of trusts and trust companies
was...focuses on business; investment; the purchase, sale, and development of land; and the
facilitation of Jewish immigration to Palestine”.172 By the mid-1930s, Zionist organizations were
using private trusts for these purposes throughout all of Palestine for the purchase and
development of property173. This helped to further develop sectarian legal structures within the
Mandate as Zionist Jews, and Europeans would privilege these court systems as a means for
furthering their objectives in Mandated Palestine. Civil charitable trusts and the sectarian court
system helped to further developed the political, legal, and social space between Arabs, and the
Mandate officials and Zionist settlers.
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Prior to the development of the private English trust however, the SMC took a similar
stance with waqf and property. Michael Dumper has argued that, “the British Mandate
government’s co-optation of the waqf system’s leadership, and the degree of control it exercised
over waqf system resources, reveal the nature of the waqf system’s relationship with the state and
the extent to which it came to constitute a mediating institution”.174 This mediation also had a
development and land control scheme. On this Dumper claims that “during the height of its
struggle [claims of rights over certain waqf] in the 1930s against British government policies and
Zionist immigration, the Council also embarked upon extensive land reclamation schemes,
draining and irrigating desert and swampland to increase their productivity175.” This indicates
that in the developing political sphere of the Mandate period, urban space was gradually
becoming politicized and contested. Dumper states that, like the usage of English trusts in the
later 1930s, the SMC was using waqf as a means of urban and political control against the
backdrop of Zionist encroachment and Mandate objectives.
Ultimately, the SMC operated within an institutional space which sought to preserve waqf
status within Palestine. This was due to archaeological schemes that infringed on the rights of
Palestinian waqf as a means of building a Zionist state. However, the SMC lacked strong
purchasing power. This caused a purchasing scheme of a scattered manner throughout Palestine.
They would send researchers to Istanbul to retrieve information on waqf property when
necessary and would encourage their constituents to endow their property into waqf dhurri
(family endowments) as a means of alienating the property in order that it could not be
174
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purchased176. This unfortunately was the praxis of Mandate and their policies. The Mandate
used their legal and governance framework to evade legal rights of the waqf properties they
infringed on. The result of this created a politics of space that turned some of the spaces into sites
of contention as the next chapter will illustrate. Principally being a part of the urban landscape,
the SMC sought to preserve a Palestinian status quo of that urban landscape and for it to be
legitimized and respected within the Mandate system.

4.4 Conclusion
The legal and governance framework of the Mandate placed the waqf system under a
state-building and urban development regime within the Mandate system. Waqf under the SMC
was becoming a means of urban development and control against the Mandate’s ideological
commitments and state-building goals. Waqf gained political utilization against the modes of
political change and deconstruction of meaning and space of the city in Palestine. In effect, the
SMC and the Mandate powers can be seen as two offices of development. The SMC had a
grounding perspective of preserving the continuance of Arab local agency in the space, whereas
the Mandate office of development focused the renewal of urban space through the guise of their
Zionist-Christian and modernist commitments. This was shown throughout the chapter by
showing how the Town Planning regimes and the SMC were formed along the lines of these
ideologies. Through these developments a contention and politics of space emerged as the
meaning of Palestinian space was being redefined. The politics of these spaces will be discussed
in further detail through a case study on the ‘the Old City’/ Jerusalem of Jerusalem in the
following chapter.
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5. The Politics of Space and Waqf in Jerusalem
5.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to show how the Mandate Zionist-Christian envisioning of Palestine
affected how the built environment and geography of Palestine was governed and managed. One
of the elements of this built environment that was on infringed by the Mandate powers was waqf.
The case study of Jerusalem shows that awqaf were infringed on by the Department of
Archaeology programs. The Mandate Officials within the Department of Archaeology affected
how Palestinian institutions functioned the urban fabric of Jerusalem.177 The redefining of the
city through archaeology is what Nadia Abu El-Haj states as a “national hobby,” or as the
groundwork of a, “national identity and national rights shaped the discipline and characterized its
relationship to the work of nation-state building during the first decades of statehood178.” The
Mandate’s language of how the built environment ought to be seen and understood was not the
way Palestinians within Jerusalem viewed or lived in the city. The contention arose from the
Mandate officials joining in with this process of state-building for a Jewish nation. The
Mandate’s commitment to their state-building effected the meaning of how institutions within
the city operated. Waqf then was one area where these conflicting meanings met. In order to
articulate this the chapter will be divided into two main sections. The first section gives legal and
political context of the Department of Archaeology (DOA) and the use of the Zionist-Christian
The usage of urban fabric is closely aligned with Géraldine Pflieger and Céline Rozenblat’s article, “Introduction.
Urban Networks and Network Theory: The City as the Connector of Multiple Networks,” in Urban Studies ,
November 2010, Vol. 47, No. 13, Special Issue: Urban Networks and Network Theory (November 2010), pp. 27232735. They argue that cities function within a multilayered network of networks. Within a globalizing city these
networks grow to encompass the local and imported, however, the hegemony power often times dictates what the
ethos of the polis ought to be.
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ideology through the case of the Tower of Ramla/The Minaret of the White Mosque. The second
section deals with the city of Jerusalem and how this duality of meaning operated within the
DOA’s actions. The two sub-case are the archaeological digs at Mount of Ophel and the City
Walls project of Jerusalem. This section details how the Mandate through the DOA encroached
on waqf rights.

5.2 Tower of Ramla/The Minaret of the White Mosque
The first place of contention being discussed is at the site of the ‘Tower of Ramla’. This
site helps to contextualize the actions and policies of the Mandate were grounded within their
Zionist-Christian ideology. The contention around how to define the ‘Tower of Ramla’ details
one of the sites of contention between the Supreme Muslim Council and the Department of
Antiquities in defining of the built environment of Palestine. The first section details how the
battle of defining of the Tower/Minaret was centered around whether or not the legal waqf rights
were to be upheld over a Christianized vision of the Tower/Minaret’s past. The second section of
this case study gives further context to through the discussion of Antiquity law in Palestine and
how this supported the Zionist and Mandate’s state-building agenda.
In Dotan Halevy’s study, “Ottoman Ruins Captured: Antiquities, Preservation, and Waqf
in Mandatory Palestine,” details this legal battle of how Mandate sought how the tower ought to
be described, understood, and preserved as a Western-Christian structure against the Supreme
Muslim Council understanding.179 The British Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
(O.E.T.A.) (South) saw gathering and studying Palestinian’s antique past as an important
Dotan Halevy, “Ottoman Ruins Captured: Antiquities, Preservation, and Waqf in Mandatory Palestine,” in
Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, vol. 5, no. 1 (2018), pp 91-114.
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function of their control. The O.E.T.A (South) was the governing British body prior to the
official endorsement of the League of Nations in June of 1922 giving British control Mandate
status. The O.E.T.A (South) legalized the control of antiquities through two ordinances and
setting up the governmental body, the Department of Antiquities in 1920. On February 16th the
O.E.T. issued Ordinance 86, “Conservation of Ancient Monuments,” which states, “Throughout
the Occupied Enemy Territory (South) the property in all antiquities which were the property of
the Ottoman Government, or which have been discovered since the occupation or shall hereafter
be discovered shall be deemed to be vested in the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
(South).” This language was further defined within a secondary ordinance applying to this one in
October of the same year. The updated language of Ordinance 195 on October 1st states, “All
antiquities whether of a movable character or fixed in the soil which shall be hereafter
discovered shall be deemed to be the property of the Government180.” These ordinances gave the
British power over land in which they deemed that land or things within the land were of antique
manner. These ordinances additionally setup the Department of Antiquities (DOA) as a
formalized department of the government.
The project around the Tower of Ramla began in October of 1920 alongside the
formalization of the DOA as a government department. The Tower was being studied almost
immediately by the DOA when the department came online as a government department. In
October 1920 saw this site as an important and placed it under the legal control of the
government. The DOA from October 1920 through June 1922 attempted to keep it within a grey
zone of definitions in order to monumentalized it as a historical structure deemed as a Christian
Ordinance 86, “Conservation of Ancient Monuments,” in Official Gazette of Palestine, No. 15, (16th, February
1920), pp. 1; and “Antiquities Ordinance,” in Ordinance 195 in Official Gazette of Palestine, No. 29, (1st, October
1920), pp. 6.
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structure. The only opposition was the chief inspector Ernest J. Macky who rendered it a minaret
in October of 1920181. Within this two-year period the DOA in the attempt to take further control
of the Tower was through placing language on the structure of it being under duress and could
“crumble away” at any moment. An architectural engineer was hired to evaluate the stability of
the structure. They indicated that the structure was sound. The DOA working alongside the
Archaeological Advisory Board ignored the conclusion of an architectural engineer that the
structure. The DOA’s story of concern towards the Towers was used through May of 1922. They
claimed many times in those two years that the structure was standing by miraculous
circumstances.182 The use of decay here was used as a means of expectancy to render the Tower
under the control of the DOA.
Alongside these actions when the British DOA was attempting to restore the Tower as a
Christian instillation they attempted to co-opt the “local waqf administration of Ramla, Jaffa, and
Jerusalem in 1921.183” Their goal through this was to collaborate with the waqf authorities while
knowing it was waqf property to render it strictly as a monument of history and outside of
current use by keeping it within a legal grey zone. This would allow the DOA to control the
narrative of the Tower even though it had historical significance without allowing it to have
religious “living” status184. This idea that the DOA had was interrupted when in the same year
formed the Supreme Muslim Council placing local Waqf Councils under their administration.
The battle over the defining of the Tower shifted once the SMC was established in
October of 1922. The preservation project the DOA was attempting to develop was brought to a
Dotan Halevy, “Ottoman Ruins Captured: Antiquities, Preservation, and Waqf in Mandatory Palestine,” pp. 97.
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halt by the SMC. The SMC declared the tower waqf property in October 1922. The tower
transferred from a monument of antiquity to “a ‘living’ structure of current religious use”.185
This would place the legal administration of the Tower no longer under the Department of
Antiquities, but under the SMC. However, the once SMC gain the legal control of the Tower
their project was not autonomous. The project’s financials were still under the control of the
British DOA and the Department of Public Work (DPW). This allowed the DOA and the DPW
to slow down the restoration project. It took an additional two years in 1924 for the project to be
finished. In 1924 the Tower became the official site as an active building where the Al-Nabi
Salih celebration was held. However, even after the Tower of Ramla was deemed a minaret of
the White Mosque and a living waqf structure; the DOA continued to call it “a ‘picturesque and
historical monument,’ a ‘landmark’, an ‘interesting tower’ or plainly - 'The Tower’.” In 1927 the
British government issued new money tender in Palestine. Prior to 1927 Palestinian tender was
the Egyptian pound. The new Palestinian Pound notes in 1927 depicted different landscapes
throughout Palestine. The Mandate depicted the “Tower of Ramla” on the Palestinian 10 Pound
note as the “Crusaders Tower” indicating that even though legally the structure was waqf
property the Mandate powers still envisioned it as a Christian monument.186

5.2.1 Antiquity Law and the Recasting of Palestine
The Department of Archaeology (DOA) and The Supreme Muslim Council (SMC)
battled over how the Tower of Ramla/Minaret of the White Mosque was to be legally defined.
The Tower of Ramla/Minaret of the White Mosque case is useful in showing how the antiquity
law and the DOA worked in tandem with the ideological positionings of the Mandate powers.
185
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This section further details how antiquity law was used in connection with the Department of
Archaeology. I first show how antiquity law was applied within the legal battle around the
Tower/Minaret, and second, I discuss the connection of this law to the British Mandate’s ZionistChristian modernist ideological adherences.
Dotan Havley argues that the British’s application of antiquity law through the DOA
bolstered the orientalist conception of “Ottoman decline” and grounded the Zionist-Christian
visage of Palestine within its Mandate system.187 The desire to define what was antique and
what was not antique added to the conception of Ottoman decay and neglect within Palestine.
The Mandate officials believed that the Tower/Minaret was an item of antiquity, and they
strongly argued that it was the Ottoman Empire that allowed for the Tower/Minaret to decline in
integrity and stability. They articulated that they neglected any period that came before them and
allowed the built environment to decay. The DOA’s job was to recover and rescue structures like
the Tower/Minaret as both a means for preserving antiquity and to use these rescued items as
material culture to support the building of a Zionist state. In connection to their conception of
decay, antiques within British Palestine were defined as anything older than 1700 C.E. Havley
argues that this definition aided the DOA in, “render[ing] artifacts and structures form the last
two centuries of Ottoman rule as dispensable188.” The DOA, Halvey states, “did not deny the
existence of Ottoman engagement with architecture but required reading it only as an utter
distortion to earlier periods – a persistent contamination of the land with decay”.189 The
privileging of earlier periods gave the DOA and the Mandate considerable control over the built
environment they governed.
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The antiquity regimes within British Cyprus showed very similar patterns. Reyhan Sabri,
and Alexis Reppas have both shown that the British used the Curator of Ancient Monuments,
and the Central Evkaf (waqf) Administration to control the built environment of Cyprus for
British aims190. One of these aims were to use these departments in coordination with other
government departments like the Public Works Department to remove away the built Ottoman
environment191. Additionally, Cyprus was a learning ground for the British in their application of
Ottoman land laws and that Reppas argues the British modified the language of these laws from
one of “relational” status for the taxation of land to one of “management”192. When the 1858
Ottoman Land Code was applied by the British in Palestine it came with an updated legal
framework based on case law from Cyprus. This understanding of British Imperial control of
land was applied within Palestine through on the ground officials like that of Land Law Court
judge R.C. Tute’s English translation of the 1858 Land Code.193 Thus, when the project to
restore the tower began in October 1920, the British officialdom employed an ‘antiquity regime’
language couched in Imperial heritage of antiquity control.
Thus, within the preview of the British antiquity law, the site of the Tower of Ramla
could be seen through a dual set of perceptions. On one hand, the British saw the tower as an
antique item of Christian and Western significance. On the other, it was a waqf property that had
significance religious meaning for the Palestinians and could not be infringed on due to its
Reyhan Sabri, “Transitions in the Ottoman Waqf’s Traditional building upkeep and Maintenance in Cyprus
during the British colonial era (1878-1960) and the emergence of selective architectural conversation practices,” in
International Journal of Heritage Studies, vol. 21, no. 5 (2015) pp. 512-527. Alexis Rappas, “The Sultan’s Domain:
British Cyprus’ Role in the Redefinition of Property Regimes in the Post-Ottoman Levant,” in The International
History Review, vol. 41, no. 3 (2019), pp. 624-649.
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“living status”. Thus, the legal framework of antiquity through the British officials envisioning
of the landscape of Palestine within this preservation case was juxtaposed with the “waqfi logic
of maintaining durable and practical built environments”. 194 The British sought to historize
space and construct the Minaret of Ramla as a Christian structure, whereas the SMC saw the
built environment as waqf. The Minaret being waqf property had a “flexible nature of structural
change, exemplifying a perception of history as contingent and therefore continual.”195 The
perpetuity awarded to the endowment of the property gives the waqf itself legal rights of
preservation in which conditions it as “living” and not able to be defined otherwise or infringed
on based on external conditions.
The antiquity laws that were applied by the British Mandate was a site of contention
within the defining of the geography and meaning of the geography for Palestine. This
geography included the structures on the land and in the land as the framing of what the ideology
of the geography meant was crucial in how those laws were applied. The British privileged a
historical/antiquitized Zionist-Christian understanding of Palestine’s geography on Palestine and
their goal through this was to unearth the positivist case for this dreamed reality. Nadi Abu ElHaj argues that,
“Archaeological practice would henceforth involve puzzle solving, which continually
extended the empirical basis of the original theory, a practice in which key background
assumptions, nationalist and nationalizing, were never questioned. Simultaneously,
this scholarly debate is perhaps best understood as an ongoing practice of settler
nationhood, one that repeatedly reenacted and reinstated the "national collective" in
empirical form, facts of positive science that emerged as an independent evidentiary
basis upon which the work of archaeology itself would henceforth rely and within which
the ancient Israelite nation would emerge as visible.196”
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El-Haj’s here is arguing within primarily the post-Mandate era, but the same framework of
supporting a building of nation within the Mandate can be found as well. The British
archaeological regimes sought to bring forth a Zionist past for a Zionist future nation-state as
enshrined the Mandate itself. Within the case of the Minaret of Ramla, the British Department of
Archaeology clearly privileged this framework and continued to privilege a past over the current
realities that were there. Within this framework, waqf became a place of contention in two
conditions. The first being that waqf was seen as incongruent to the projects of the DOA in
recasting Palestine within their Zionist-Christian imagery. The second is in the legal conditions
in which waqf was situated. Once a property was deemed as endowed it had legal rights and
could not be under the direct control of the DOA. Within the case of the Tower of Ramla, these
rights were awarded to the minaret. This was not universal as the artifact of antiquity was often
privileged over the built structures the everyday Palestinian used and lived within. Archaeology,
thus, became a tool of the Mandate regime to bring forth the Zionist nation-state. In the case of
Jerusalem as follows, this also meant returning the city to a dreamed past through a positivist
discovery of Zionist national ethos and away from a lived present of the local Palestinians.

5.3 Jerusalem: Waqf as Lived Environments
This section deals with waqf with Jerusalem at two sites. The first of these sites is the
area called The Mount of Ophel/Asludha. The second site is the area around the north wall of
Jerusalem. The analysis of these cases shows further encroachment on the rights of waqf and the
daily life of Palestinians. Before detailing these cases, the first part of this section deals with a
brief contextualization of the city of Jerusalem prior to and during the Mandate. This
contextualization serves two purposes. The first is to show how ideology played into the
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Westerners conception of the city, and second, is to show how prevalent waqf was in the built
environment of Palestine.
To begin with, Jerusalem by 1910 was no longer a “city within walls”. Vincent Lemire’s
recent book on Jerusalem at the turn of the 20th century argues through the deconstruction of a
European view of Jerusalem to a real and grounded sense of the city prior to the British
Mandate.197 From the period of 1800 A.D. to the eve of World War I, the population grew sevenfold (estimated 10,000 persons to 70,000 persons).198 This growth in population outgrew the
space of the “old city”, which caused urban development outside of the city walls. The
development was not looked on favorably by the missionary organizations of the city. Their fear
that the biblical city was going to be replaced by the new modern city outside of the ‘Old
City’/Jerusalem or a new city on the outside of the Walls of David. This language delineated the
modern development outside of Jerusalem as ‘new’, differentiating it from the ‘old’ of
Jerusalem. In both a connection to and a signifier of city expansion, La Terre Sainte (The Holy
Land) a Franciscan missionary journal in Palestine indicated in 1889 indicated that “the holy city
keeps on expanding; on the road to Jaffa, houses touch one another more than a kilometer from
the walls”.199 The new city had a population of 2000 (6%) of the combined population of
Jerusalem in 1880. By 1914, the new city had 35,000 (50%) persons of the combined population
of Jerusalem.200

197

Vincent Lemire, Jerusalem 1900: The Holy City in the Age of Possibilities, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2017)
198
Id., 21.
199
Quoted from Vincent Lemire, Jerusalem 1900, pp, 21; La Terre Sainte 33 [April 1889]: pp, 110.
200
Id., 25. Figure 1 comes Vincent Lemire, Jerusalem 1900, pp. 24.

96

Figure 1 Map of Jerusalem (1894-95) by Conrad Schick

Franciscan missionaries in 1890 were defining the “old” city through a categorical
delineation of four-quarters based on religious affiliation as the “new” city was being developed.
Lemire argues this construction of Western missionary organizations informed how other
Western institutions and organizations view of the city. Similarly to the Minaret of Ramla,
Jerusalem was seen within in a dichotomy of, “the city lived by its inhabitants,” and, “the city
dreamed (and traversed) by Western visitors.”201 The British officials within the Mandate and
archaeological regimes and organizations saw the same imaging.202 The perspective of those the
Mandate official saw Jerusalem (“the Old City”) as a neglected Zionist urban fabric in which
was need to be patrimonialized and reconstructed in to a city of Jewish and Christian sites. The
Mandate’s “patrimonial construction” was a project of state-building through which archaeology
regimes were used to give places within Jerusalem a new Zionist meaning203.
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The Mandate’s conceptualization of antiquity within the legal system of Palestine and
their state-building mission was also applied within Jerusalem/Jerusalem. Much like Cyprus and
the Minaret of Ramla, Jerusalem was constructed by a Zionist and anti-Ottoman perspective
from the start. The conceptualization of the Old City/Jerusalem structurally resulting in pitting a
continuum of a “lived city” against a quite literal constructed dreamed city through
archaeological regimes.204 Waqf within this contention was at the center as it often was a place in
which the archaeological regimes sought to infringe in order to bring forth artifacts. These
regimes were done to uncover what the city was through the context of a Zionist national history
and how the urban fabric then ought to be understood. Thus, waqf came under attack because of
competing views of what Jerusalem urban fabric was and how the future of the urban fabric
ought to be.
In their recently published study, Jerusalem Properties and Endowments, Munir Fakher
Eldin and Salim Tamari show how throughout the Mandate and until the Israeli annexation in
1967, Jerusalem’s urban fabric in many ways continued practices of endowment.205 Their study
clearly shows that waqf was a mainstay of the urban fabric and how the inhabitants, in part,
lived. Through correlating data, and GIS (Geographical Information Sciences) mapping
technology they were able to show the urban fabric of Jerusalem has had a make-up of nearly
60% waqf land until the 1967 annexation (Figure 1 and 2)206:
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Figure 2 Waqf Land verses Privately Owned Land

Figure 3 Waqf categories of Christian, Muslim and Family

Figures 1 and 2 show waqf was a widely used urban institution within the fabric of the Old
City/Jerusalem. Also, waqf property was not denominational. Rather, waqf was a general
institution used by a vast number of the citizens of the city. Eldin and Tamari additionally
indicate that Anglican property existed within the waqf domain. From Figure 4, the Christian
body within Jerusalem accounted for 28% of all waqf properties and 43% of all waqf property.
Furthermore, the authors show that a large portion of waqf property was deemed Holy Land (alard muqdis) and correlated with it being defined within a public domain. 207
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Figure 4 Church Waqf within Al-Quds

This indicates the contestation within the urban fabric was not merely a Muslim issue but
rather a Jerusalemite/Palestinian issue. El-Din and Tamari’s work helps to visualize waqf
properties as a Palestinian institution. This being the case, when the British infringe on waqf
rights within the city there is a greater unified activation among the population as will be seen as
the institution benefited the majority of the population of Jerusalem. The historical continuity of
waqf within the city against the Mandate’s Zionist state-building through archaeology
conditioned the way in which the Mandate system functioned within Jerusalem. This structure
helped to produce the contested urban fabric and the anxieties of the Palestinians against the
backdrop of other Zionist projects. In part, the archaeological regimes within Jerusalem and its
infringement on waqf is another example of struggle within the Palestinians desire for nationhood. The Arab/Palestinian understanding of the urban fabric of Jerusalem is within a continued
function whereas the Mandate system through the Department of Archaeology sees Jerusalem as
dilapidated, in need of modernization, and a re-Urb within a Zionist nation-state building effort.
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This re-folkerization and state-building can be seen within the archaeology regime of the
British Mandate. The regime of antiquitizing Jerusalem had a more direct conflict with
inhabitants of Jerusalem. The Minaret of Ramla became a more formalized site of important
pilgrimage through the legal battle, whereas waqf within the city functioned within the daily life
of the city’s inhabitants. This direct action of the Department of Archaeology and its
infringement on waqf rights had a more direct effect within the daily life of Palestinians. Within
the case of Jerusalem, the British Department of Antiquities (DOA) privileged a Zionist antiquity
over the living-built environment of the city. This caused political anxiety within the population
of Jerusalem because waqf was not stagnant within a historized and sanctified past but was a part
of the living urban environment of the present moment. In addition to the many other
infringements of the Mandate powers and the Zionist state-building motives, the infringements
on waqf added to the activation of the Palestinian movement against the encroachment against
the British Mandate and the Zionist settler-colonialism. In order to show this, two places within
the jurisdiction of Jerusalem will be further explored to show the aforementioned relationship of
contention. The first of these sites is the Mount of Ophel. The second of the sites is the “Walls of
the City of David” restoration project. These sites show in different ways how the DOA was able
to circumnavigate waqf rights for their archaeological schemes within Jerusalem. These cases
give and show particular details on how the DOA and archaeological projects were privileged
over the built environment of the Palestinian people within Jerusalem.
5.3.1 Mount Ophel/Asludha
Billie Meriman has shown in the case of Mount Ophel within the jurisdiction of
Jerusalem there were very similar battles around how the British antiquitized and as sites
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resurrecting a Zionist national-myth208. In 1920 the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC) was aware
of Mount Ophel/Asludha already being deem as a site of antiquity by the British and other
archaeological organizations like the British Palestinian Exploration Fund (PEF). This was
because it was assumed to be “real Zion” or the actual site of the City of David. Due to this
assumption the British Department of Archaeology (DOA) in 1922 officially saw Mount Ophel
as an important site for excavation.209 Once the DOA decided to conduct a dig at the site the
SMC moved forward with confronting the Mandate as the site contained waqf land. On the 12th
of August 1923 the SMC sent a petition to the Mandate officials indicating that the land the
DOA wished to use as a dig site was waqf land. Within this petition they argued the DOA should
not conduct the dig because the digging would infringe on the rights of the waqf.210 In response
to this petition, on the 16th of August the Director of Antiquities stated,
“The plot of ground locally known as “Asludha” formerly belonged to the Ma’aref but
since before the war it has be registered as Government property in the Turkish land
registers. In addition to this, it has been registered since the 15th July 1922 as an
antiquity site without any comment on the part of the Waqf. The Waqf claim cannot
therefore be entertained and I shall be grateful if you will inform the Ma’mour of this
fact. I refer you to Section 18 of the Antiquities Ordinance211.”

Unlike the Tower of Ramla, the DOA was more aggressive with defining the site as a site of
antiquity. The DOA effective stated that the petition was null-in-void because it did not fit the
criteria of other legal measures within the Mandate system and could circumnavigate any
possible waqf rights. In addition, the above quote clearly demonstrates how the Mandate’s
archaeology regimes were able redefine property. Since the site was deemed a site of antiquity it
208
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became property of the Mandate and no longer waqf. In addition to this the Mandate in the early
years placed property of the Turkish or Ottoman Government gave the Mandate an additional
legal claim on the land. This was laid out in Ordinance No. 145 giving the O.E.T.A (South) legal
jurisdiction and managerial powers over the Turkish/Ottoman enemy territory.212
On August 28, 1923, the Ma’mur of Waqfs Jerusalem sent a letter to the DOA in
disagreement with the statement issued by the Chief Inspector of Antiquities, Philip Langstaffe
Ord Guy (1885-1952), regarding the legal claim of the Mandate on the land. The SMC through
the Ma’mur argued that the land called Asludha by the local Arab population was waqf. They
argued that categorizing of Plots 5 and 7, as “historical” or “antique” was illegal because of it
being waqf property. The Ma’mur highlighting the rights of the waqf property stated, “Your
Excellency knows the illegality of the expropriation of Waqf Lands, without having any
connection in a legal matter. I beg that an amendment of this registration be made, requesting the
Department of Antiquities not to interfere in the question of this land.”213 Not much was made of
this petition to the Mandate officials as the project on Mount Ophel/Asludha continued. A year
later, on the 13th of July 1924 Al-Huseni sent the Director of the DOA a letter entailing that the
land in which they were excavating was indeed waqf land. Al-Huseni states, “We agree with
what is stated in your letter [from 7/29/1923] provided that the Department of Antiquities rents
the waqf land from the Department of Jerusalem Endowments where the Department [of
Antiquities] wants to process the settlement, and please accept this graciously.”214 The SMC was
attempting to make the DOA respect the rights of the waqf land through the renting of the land as
this would allow for the SMC to have greater oversight of excavations in the area of Mount
No. 145, “Proclimation” in The Official Gazette of the Palestine, No. 15, 16th Feburary 1920, pp. 2.
Billie Melman. Empires of Antiquities., pp. 120; Ma’mar of Waqfs, Jerusalem, to District Commissioner of
Jerusalem, 28 August 1923, IAA, ATQ_39/40.
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Ophel/Asludha. However, the desire of the Al-Huseni did not matriculate. On May 19th, 1926 the
Philip Guy sent a letter to the Director of the Department of Lands in Jerusalem indicating that
because there is no material claim (registration of deed) of ownership any claim is null-invoid.215 Plot 5 was specifically mentioned because, “The matter [being] hanging for a long
period and now has become pressing: the owners of Plot 5 and the Waqf are making repeated
requests for a settlement.”216 The project on the site continued throughout the rest of the 1920s
and rights that Palestinian tenants and waqf that should have awarded for this particular plot were
stalled until 1930.217
Unlike the Ramla case, even though waqf cannot be considered an artifact of antiquity,
this case shows how the DOA and the Mandate was able to use other means to allow for the
continued digs in the Mount Ophel/Asludha site. The Minaret of Ramla was arguably not a “hill
to die on”, for the Mandate’s state-building projects in comparison to the possible unearthing of
the historical site of the City of David. However, the actions within this case match both the
desires of the British DOA and the broader administration’s mission to historicize “the City of
David” in order to unearth the Zionist national-myth. This is important in a two-fold manner.
The first being that if a historical and artifactual City of David was to be found it would give
greater credence to the nation building. The myth would move into the realm of historical fact in
the positive and scientific sense of discovery national origin. The second falls into the other
scheme within the archaeology regimes of tourism and the information industry in general. The
According to both the “Land Transfer Ordinance,” and “Land Register: Public Notice,” in order to prove lefal
rights the property needed to be connected to a legal document as proof of ownership. This allowed for an additional
condition within the case as the SMC had to prove it was not only waqf but also not Ottoman property. In The
Official Gazette of the Palestine, No. 28, 1st October 1920.
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incoming Zionist settlers were supported by these new revisions of the geography to the land
through the symbiotic relationship of archaeology, Mandate control, and tourism.218 In the
commitment to building the national-myth of Palestine Mount Ophel was further couch within a
Zionist/Jewish naming framework. In the 1930s it was referenced as Mount Zion rather than
Ophel. In response to the designation by the Mandate powers of Plots 5 and 7 as ‘historical’ or
‘antique’ the SMC attempted to render as many rights to the waqf land and to the Palestinians
who utilized the land prior to the archaeological excavations as they did in the Tower of Ramla
case. The Mount Ophel/Asludha site subtly became a site of contention as the Mandate officials
curtailed any legal rights the waqf property had through the delegitimizing of those legal rights
through their proclivity towards their archaeological and registration regimes.
5.3.2 Jerusalem
The previous cases give context to talk about how archeology was used in Jerusalem and
how these how modes of governance affect the status of waqf within the city. As mentioned
previously, archaeology in Palestine was a dual process of discovery and preservation in order to
aid in the Zionist state-building of Palestine. The “Walls of the City of David” project gives
further context of how the Mandate system used these archaeological regimes.
The walls of Jerusalem were under a continuous construction project from 1925 to 1948
as the Department of Archaeology and the Department of Publics Works (DOW) saw the walls
as dilapidated and neglected. Between 1925 and 1927, the DOA and DOW laid out the
archeological zoning of the city and determined what projects they could begin within that
218
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zoning.219 These actions parallel the Town Planning Schemes that Robert Home and Patrick
Geddes developed for Jerusalem, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the city was seen primarily as the
historical site of the City of David. It was conventional understanding that Jerusalem was the
ancient city of the Hebrews by the DOA and archaeological organizations in Palestine even
though there were debates about this as previously mentioned in the Mount Ophel/Asluadha
case. There were many archaeological projects within Jerusalem but the preservation project of
the walls of Jerusalem is particularly helpful for understanding further infringements waqf
property. The goals for the archaeological project “Walls of the City of David” were to bring life
back to the walls as an ancient Hebrew structure. These goals, again, placed further contention
between Palestinians and the Mandate and Zionist bodies as the DOA privileged the Zionist
state-building project over waqf rights.
One the first places that this contention arises is in the “North Wall” portion of the project
that begun on the 15th of June 1925, when The District Governor of the Jerusalem-Jaffa District
in Jerusalem L.A. Mayer approved the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society excavation rights
near the wall.220 As this project came online, Palestinians who were living in the area were
attempting to build housing. Abdal Salam Nashashibi’s housing project was one of these that
was halted. On two separate instances John Garstang the Director of Antiquities appealed to
departments of the Mandate to halt the building of Nashashibi’s house. The first of these
instances was an appeal to the Jerusalem Town Planning Commission of Jerusalem on the 9th of
July, 1925.221 Garstang argued this building would block the ancient wall implying a language of
No. 1913/9 -  מGovernment of Palestine, Department of Archeology/Public Works, Archeaological ZoneJerusalem, 1925-1927
220
Excavation Permit No.25L North Wall of Jerusalem, 15 th June 1925, IAA, Jerusalem. North Wall, ATQ_42 (200/
200)
221
Ancient North Wall of Jerusalem: Preservation. 1/2 (Pre-Byzantine Foundations), 9th July, 1925, IAA, Jerusalem.
North Wall, ATQ_42 (200/ 200)
219

106

“clutter” against the preferred antiquity of the wall for urban planning. The second of these
instances was an appeal to the Attorney General and was also on the 9th of July.222 This appeal
was to the same Antiquity Ordinance (No. 145) that was being applied to the case on Mount
Ophel/Asluadha. In response, Norman Bentwhich the Attorney General stated that the area ought
to be defined within antiquity as it was private property. By the 27th of July 1925 Nashashibi was
required to stop building within the area as it was now legal defined as a site of antiquity.223
At the same time, as Nashashibi’s building project was being halted, other properties
within the area were experiencing friction with the DOA. The mutawalli Mohammed Osman
Ressas (guardian) of Sheikh Saad Isiid’s Waqf on October 30th, 1925, sent a letter to John
Garstang and stated that the entire period of excavation has infringed on the life of waqf in the
North Wall area. Osman Ressas claimed that the DOA and the Jewish Palestine Exploration
Society were digging up waqf lands. He indicated that the lands the “Wakf belong to a great
number of blined [blind], poor, and weak people,” and they could not be used as farming land as
the digging rendered the area as unusable. The archaeological dig not only disturbed the charity
for which the waqf was providing but it also placed a burden on the Mutawalli for repair and
maintaining of the waqf. Osman Ressas stated, “… therefore I aware you and give you a word till
fortnight either you will cover and return said Wakf Lands as they have been before or you will
be responsible for all the damages and loss and pay the rent of the lands and the price of the
222
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water runs into the cisterns…” replacing the burden of upkeep back on the DOA for their
damages.224
The response to this petition by Osman Ressas was not taken with full writ as both the
Director of Antiquities and the Director of Lands both signed off on the land had not been in use
since before the occupation, and that only momentary compensation will be given in return. This
answer to Osman Ressas’ original petitioning was not satisfying for the Mutawalli. As
excavation in the area continued, he again submitted a petition regarding the land on June 8th,
1926. Within the petition he stated,
“As I am the [Mutawalli] of the abovementioned lands and am supposed to safeguard
the crops thereof, lest the poor persons might be grieved and --- the winter season for
the gathering of the water and the ploughing of the lands was approaching I have
submitted a petition to the Director of Antiquities in the form of a notification so that
he might return the land to its previous condition so that I might be enabled to plough
and months have passed and the lands of the wakf are still in the hands of the
Department of Antiquities which we have under gone considerable losses. I beg to
submit herewith a copy of the [first] petition I have already submitted to the Director
of Antiquities and beg that a committee be assigned for estimating the rents of the
lands and the cost of the water which I have already lost so that our rights might be
granted to us.”225

This second petition gives further detail than just the fact the archaeological continued and that
the waqf land was not property recompensed. One of the most striking details is that even though
the Mutawalli could indicate and show the land was indeed waqf the DOA was able to usurp its
rights for the purpose of archaeology.
As the “Walls of the City of David” restoration project continued more sites of contention
arose. On August 9th, 1927, the Mandate seized all construction of properties on or near the
224
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walls, repairs and even removal of rubbish unless one was given the approval by the Department
of Antiquities signed by Norman Bentwich (Appendix 3).226 In a progressive and aggressive
move property was made static under the discretion of the DOA, whereas before it was site by
site which the DOA was given approval of antiquity. This for a coalition of Jerusalemites in
protest through petitioning advocated that this measure was going to adversely affect the position
and livelihood of the waqf property existing along the walls.227 The members of the coalition
included prominent Muslims, leaders of the Latin Church, Syrian Catholic, and the Orthodox
Church.228 Arguably drawing from direct personal experience, denominational experience, or
through the word of infringed of the waqf managed by Osman Ressas they saw this act as
another condition that would lay the groundwork for further infringement.
They indicated that most of the property along the walls were endowed properties and
this action was an aggression against both the awqaf and Palestinian property along the wall.
They argued that the Ordinance published on August 9th would lead to, “a simple aggression on
our property rights which must involve the spoilation [excavation] of these properties which are
protested in all the laws of the Earth.”229 They collectively saw this petition as protest against the
Mandate officials acts within their Town Planning/archaeological schemes within Jerusalem.
Being aware of what the Town Plaining and archaeological schemes where they gave additional
considerations to why this Ordinance should not be enshrined within the Planning Commission
of Jerusalem:
“1. A great part of the land property under consideration [Town Planning Commission]
lies in the best places of the city and the values thereof are consequently very high; and
No. 1913/9 -  מGovernment of Palestine, Department of Archeology/Public Works, Archeaological ZoneJerusalem, ISA 1925-1927. pp76.
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owing to the fact that these lands are situated just near public roads, their owners hope
to reap out of them great rewards …
2. To the fact that the proposed law authorises the department of Antiquities to be body
which will have exclusive rights to repair any of the existing buildings in the area under
consideration, when such reparation is required, clearly means that it is the wish that
these buildings should be removed by degrees. Whereas these building properties are
either the sole sources of livelihood for the maintenance of churches and chapels or for
distribution among the poor of the interested communities...
3. A great part of the properties are Wakfs and the application of the proposed law
conflicts with the conditions laid down by the endowers of these Wakfs and thus it is
illegal, and should not be applied.230

Like other petitions the Palestinians in Jerusalem sent to the Mandate officials this petition fell
on deaf ears. The above petition against the formalization of the archaeology regimes within the
Town Planning Commission shows two important things. The first is that infringement on
property and particularly waqf rights were consistent with the Town Planning and archaeology
regimes within the Mandate. The second is that the local population was aware of effect the
objectives of these regimes would have on their everyday life. The petition was not drawn from a
hypothetical rendering of possible outcomes of the objectives but through experiences that
Palestinians were already experiencing. Archaeology was affecting some of the best Palestinian
property, the distribution of charity to the needy, and the awqaf which often laid at the
intersection of the other two. Churches, mosques, and the livelihoods of people were also being
infringed on as the archaeological regimes seized land and property for their state-building
objectives. Yet, the objectives of the archaeological and town planning regimes continued after
1927. Figure 5 below shows the map for the Town Planning Commission wall project in 1931.
Two of these properties are of specific note. Properties JJ and OO in the Northern part of the city
230
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were familial domical and the DOA and the Public Works Department was effective in removing
these families from the property and exerting eminent domain.231

Figure 5 The 1931 Mapping of the Jerusalem Walls Project

The actions of the Mandate officials were guided by their Zionist-Christian ideology to see
Palestine as the future home of the Jews. This ideology lead departments of the Mandate
government like the DOA and the Town Planning Commission to support this claim through
unearthing and preserving a material culture in the support of the Zionist state-building project.
The city of Jerusalem for the Mandate was a particularly important cite for this state-building as
it was perceived to be the “City of David”. In order to reconstitute this past the Mandate enacted
a framework of power through expropriation, and negligence to the voices of everyday
Palestinians in Jerusalem to obtain this goal. This framework of power was principally the
No. 4145/9 -  מGovernment of Palestine, Department of Archeology/Public Works Department, Jerusalem City
Walls, Vol. 1, 1925-1936, pp 229-235.
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control of space. Control within emergence of the politics of space in Jerusalem was a necessity
for the Zionist projects of persevering, monumentalizing, and further grounding the Zionist
nation-state mythology.

5.4 Conclusion
The cases of the Minaret of Ramla, Mount Ophel/Asludha, and the Walls of Jerusalem
show additional conditions in which Palestinians were politically activated within their national
struggle. The British Mandate power privileged a Zionist-Christian historized ideology within
Palestine for the benefit of establishing a Zionist nation-state. This necessitated a framework of
power and control that used laws and government departments to seize Palestinian land for the
production of a material culture for the support of the Zionist national-myth. Their commitment
to this ideological state-building effort overlooked and purposely neglected the lived experience
of Palestinians.
Waqf was one institution that was directly infringed on in this process. The institution’s legal
rights over time were becoming more devalued under the Mandate’s control. The Minaret of
Ramla case shows how the Mandate Department of Archaeology fought over the defining of the
site in Ramla. Even though the SMC won the legal battle, the Mandate officials continued to see
the Minaret otherwise when they enshrined it as a Crusader structure on the 10 Pound bill. The
two cases in Jerusalem provide further detail of how legal rights of the Palestinians were
neglected for the Mandate’s state-building goals. Within the case of the Mount of
Ophel/Asludha, the DOA used eminent domain through the usage of archaeological digging to
gain control of the land in the site. This case was rather important to the DOA as it was perceived
to be the actual site of the City of David. This understanding made the desire for land control and
archaeological regimes stronger as if the DOA could discover the historicity of the City of David
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it would give greater credence to the national-myth of the Zionists. Here the infringement on
waqf rights were more pronounced as the DOA used a variation of legalese to deny the rights of
the waqf to the land.
Additionally, these cases show that the infringement on waqf rights by the Mandate was
an additional condition of the political activation of the Palestinians against the Mandate system
and the Zionist colonial project. Property rights, control of geographical space and its meaning,
and waqf infringement were at the center of a growing political contention against that
ideological hegemony.
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6. Conclusion
The aim of this study was to show the relationship between Palestinian institutions and
the Mandate’s ideological commitment to the building of a Zionist state. The thesis analyzed this
ideology through town planning and archaeological regimes in connection to local Palestinian
institutions. The study used a structural and contextual framework that traced how local
Palestinian institution of waqf was infringed on by the Mandate powers. This infringement was
informed by the British’s Zionist goals within Palestine by undermining the rights of waqf
institutions and privileging archaeological regimes promoted by officials and institutions within
urban development programs. The privileging of archaeological schemes within Palestine sought
to unearth a past of ‘antiquity’ for the production of a Zionist future. Within this development of
a material culture, the geography of Palestine quite literally was being terraformed to fit that
ideology. Waqf was a part of this dynamic change of geography as the British’s desires for
Palestine and the rights of waqf came in conflict with each other.
This study thesis was divided into four main chapters focusing on the different aspects of
this transformation. Chapter Two detailed Palestine’s political economy that was undergoing
great changes. One of these changes was the growing localization of their relationship to the
Ottoman Empire and the political system. Through local municipality and parliamentary
elections, Palestinians sought to further localize institutions within Palestine, and this included
the institution of waqf. During this period, election campaigns in particular showed that
politicians were advocating for stronger local application and control of the institution.
Following on, Chapter Three detailed the British envisioning of Palestine through a ZionistChristian and modernist lens. This ideology was principally the framework that informed the
Mandate officials’ policies and actions during this period. This ideology and their commitment to
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reshaping Palestine into a Jewish nation-state were intertwined into what is called their ‘official
mind’.
In Chapter Four, I illustrated the ways in which this Zionist-Christian ideology operated
through urban development programs during this period. In particular, this chapter sought to
contrast the actions of the Supreme Muslim Council and the biologist-town planner Patrick
Geddes. I demonstrated that while the Palestinian population saw the city as part of a continuum
of a living environment in which they were a part of, instead, Patrick Geddes, representing the
Mandate’s official mind, saw the city as dilapidated and overgrown with weeds. These weeds
were the built environment of the Turk, and other non-“native” buildings and planning the cities
had. This “nativeness” was understood to be Zionist-Christian in nature and through planning
this “native” being of city and society could be resurrected. In Chapter Five, the politics of space
and waqf was further demonstrated in a case study of Jerusalem, which grounds the previous
chapters in the actions of British state-building through the Department of Archaeology. In order
to recreate Palestine into a Zionist visage, the British needed to fully control the built
environment even if that meant infringing on the rights of native institutions. The Mandate
encroached on the rights of waqf within the city through the production of an artifactual past for
a Zionist state future.
This analysis helps us to understand how power, contention, and urban governance
operated during this transitional period in Palestine. One of the ways to look at Mandate power,
in particular, is through its subtle subversion to the societal status quo that it governed.
Palestinian society and waqf were historically interconnected and interdependent on one another.
Waqf provided a means for updating the urban geography through the foundation of coffee
houses, bath houses, hospitals, shops and so on. Through this built environment the local
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disadvantaged population within these cities had options for care through the charity that waqf
provided. More importantly, waqf built environment was a nexus point between a public and
private sector embedded within the Palestinian religious-political structure. This structure was
understood and lived as the built environment of daily life. When the British took control over
Palestine, they perceived this built environment on the one hand as ‘traditional,’ ‘cluttered,’ and
‘underdeveloped’ in the modern/industrial sense. On the other, they saw Palestine as radically
Zionist and operated to enhance this ideological stance through public governance programs like
archaeology and town planning. By tapping into these practices, the Mandate could produce a
Zionist material culture that would support their state-building efforts.
Ultimately, the British Mandate embraced Zionism in Palestine due to a historical, social
and religious tradition within the geopolitical aims of the British Empire. Beginning most
concretely in the 1850s The British Empire saw Palestine as the religious and political home of
the Jews. This conditioned the way in which the British managed and controlled Palestine. This
also led to the ways in which contention was in part activated within the Palestinian society
within that first decade of the Mandate’s life. This contention mainly manifested to counter the
Mandate’s attempts at redefining the built environment of Palestine through colonial
development and archaeology regimes.
One main domain in which Zionist-Christian ideology was being privileged was through
archeological regimes. Through unearthing the past, as Nadia Abu El-Haj articulates, was the
process of proofing the state-building process of Zionism.232 The archaeological past was the
means for the Zionist future, and this state-building process was guided and supported by the
232
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British. Palestinian property and institutions quite literally lay in the way of unearthing this
national state, and had to be pushed aside.
These measures of control were applied into the actions and policies of the Mandate
system at large as part of their state-building goals. The Mandate’s reshaping of the meaning of
the built environment of Palestine provided another condition for the national struggle of
Palestine. Waqf in many ways lost its agency against the background of the Mandate’s
ideological restructuring of Palestine. This infringement on waqf indicates the British Mandate
was that it was not a passive agent within Palestine but provided a call to action. The seed bed of
infringement on Palestinians rights and agency within their land was made within the first years
of the Mandate. This means that whether or not later officials within the Mandate Administration
seemingly became more aware of the Palestinians’ voices; the outcomes of the Zionist statebuilding efforts were embedded in the Mandate system and had become habitual.233 Power was
thus defined through ideological frameworks of an imagined state-myth promoted by both the
Mandate and its allies in the Zionist movement.
This thesis locates its contribution in waqf studies that focus on the transitional period
from the Ottoman Empire to the British Mandate. The study aimed to center waqf as a lived
institution with political and spatial dimensions, in contrast to the ‘essentialized’ strand of
literature that dominates the field. Similarly, while this thesis focused on Muslim Waqf regimes,
there are several avenues in which this further research can contribute to an expanded definition
of the role of waqf in this transitional period. For instance, future research could focus on One
the usage of waqf within the Christian body of Palestine. It was noted and shown that waqf was
233
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not an institution that only the Muslim population used, but was used among all Palestinians.
Thus, further exploration between the institution and other parts of the built environment of
Palestine will be important for further research on the subject. Another potential research focus
would be a macro-comparative study on the city within Palestine during the first 30 years of the
1900s. In order to draw stronger connections between the Mandate’s ideological leanings and
state-building, it would be interesting to explore a comparative study of town planning schemes
of different cities within Palestine. Three cities that should be studied are Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, Gaza,
and Haifa. These cities could offer the field further grounds to show how the transition from
Ottoman to British forms of governance affected these cities and the institutions of the cities. The
suspicion here is that the cities’ awqaf were also infringed on as new forms of town planning and
understandings of how the city ought to be were being placed on the cities. This research will
need to be further supported by a deeper understanding of Imperial learning when it comes to the
British Imperial “mind” around legal practice and governance of waqf. This research also has
implications for a wider regional focus, for instance developing a deeper understanding of the
impact of waqf on Iraq and Jordan under the Mandate system. This field in general is underresearched during this period as Palestine is often a central focus within the academy during the
Mandate period. Through doing more research of British Mandate outside of Palestine will give
a further understanding of how the British perceived the lands it governed, but also to help
construct how waqf may have functioned within these lands prior and during the Mandate.
This thesis dealt with Palestine’s transition from the Ottoman Empire into the Mandate. It
sought to show how local institutions change under new forms of power and meaning. The
British Mandate powers brought in pre-disposed assumptions, desires, and goals for the region.
Within Palestine, the British saw the geographical lands as fundamentally the birthplace of
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Judaism. This conditioned British Mandate officials to build a state through controlling the built
environment and recasting it within their ideological envisioning of Palestine, such as through
archaeological and town planning regimes. These regimes and programs were privileged and
supported over the local institutions of the Palestinians like waqf, which were mainstays of
Palestinian society prior to the Mandate. The infringement on waqf rights was part of the British
pursuit to control physical space and the urban imaginary in support of the ideological building
of a Zionist nation-state.
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